ipv6 specification

RFC 1885 – Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for IPv6 (OBSOLETE)

 
Network Working Group             A. Conta, Digital Equipment Corporation
Request for Comments: 1885 S. Deering, Xerox PARC
Category: Standards Track December 1995

Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6)
for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6)
Specification

Status of this Memo

This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Abstract

This document specifies a set of Internet Control Message Protocol
(ICMP) messages for use with version 6 of the Internet Protocol
(IPv6). The Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP) messages
specified in STD 5, RFC 1112 have been merged into ICMP, for IPv6,
and are included in this document.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction........................................3

2. ICMPv6 (ICMP for IPv6)..............................3

2.1 Message General Format.......................3

2.2 Message Source Address Determination.........4

2.3 Message Checksum Calculation.................5

2.4 Message Processing Rules.....................5

3. ICMPv6 Error Messages...............................8

3.1 Destination Unreachable Message..............8

3.2 Packet Too Big Message......................10

3.3 Time Exceeded Message.......................11

3.4 Parameter Problem Message...................12

4. ICMPv6 Informational Messages......................14

4.1 Echo Request Message........................14

4.2 Echo Reply Message..........................15

4.3 Group Membership Messages...................17

5. References.........................................19

6. Acknowledgements...................................19

7. Security Considerations............................19

Authors' Addresses....................................20

1. Introduction

The Internet Protocol, version 6 (IPv6) is a new version of IP. IPv6
uses the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) as defined for IPv4
[RFC-792], with a number of changes. The Internet Group Membership
Protocol (IGMP) specified for IPv4 [RFC-1112] has also been revised
and has been absorbed into ICMP for IPv6. The resulting protocol is
called ICMPv6, and has an IPv6 Next Header value of 58.

This document describes the format of a set of control messages used
in ICMPv6. It does not describe the procedures for using these
messages to achieve functions like Path MTU discovery or multicast
group membership maintenance; such procedures are described in other
documents (e.g., [RFC-1112, RFC-1191]). Other documents may also
introduce additional ICMPv6 message types, such as Neighbor Discovery
messages [IPv6-DISC], subject to the general rules for ICMPv6
messages given in section 2 of this document.

Terminology defined in the IPv6 specification [IPv6] and the IPv6
Routing and Addressing specification [IPv6-ADDR] applies to this
document as well.

2. ICMPv6 (ICMP for IPv6)

ICMPv6 is used by IPv6 nodes to report errors encountered in
processing packets, and to perform other internet-layer functions,
such as diagnostics (ICMPv6 "ping") and multicast membership
reporting. ICMPv6 is an integral part of IPv6 and MUST be fully
implemented by every IPv6 node.

2.1 Message General Format

ICMPv6 messages are grouped into two classes: error messages and
informational messages. Error messages are identified as such by
having a zero in the high-order bit of their message Type field
values. Thus, error messages have message Types from 0 to 127;
informational messages have message Types from 128 to 255.

This document defines the message formats for the following ICMPv6
messages:

ICMPv6 error messages:

1 Destination Unreachable (see section 3.1)
2 Packet Too Big (see section 3.2)
3 Time Exceeded (see section 3.3)
4 Parameter Problem (see section 3.4)

ICMPv6 informational messages:

128 Echo Request (see section 4.1)
129 Echo Reply (see section 4.2)
130 Group Membership Query (see section 4.3)
131 Group Membership Report (see section 4.3)
132 Group Membership Reduction (see section 4.3)

Every ICMPv6 message is preceded by an IPv6 header and zero or more
IPv6 extension headers. The ICMPv6 header is identified by a Next
Header value of 58 in the immediately preceding header. (NOTE: this
is different than the value used to identify ICMP for IPv4.)

The ICMPv6 messages have the following general format:

0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Code | Checksum |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
+ Message Body +
| |

The type field indicates the type of the message. Its value
determines the format of the remaining data.

The code field depends on the message type. It is used to create an
additional level of message granularity.

The checksum field is used to detect data corruption in the ICMPv6
message and parts of the IPv6 header.

2.2 Message Source Address Determination

A node that sends an ICMPv6 message has to determine both the Source
and Destination IPv6 Addresses in the IPv6 header before calculating
the checksum. If the node has more than one unicast address, it must
choose the Source Address of the message as follows:

(a) If the message is a response to a message sent to one of the
node's unicast addresses, the Source Address of the reply must
be that same address.

(b) If the message is a response to a message sent to a multicast or
anycast group in which the node is a member, the Source Address
of the reply must be a unicast address belonging to the
interface on which the multicast or anycast packet was received.

(c) If the message is a response to a message sent to an address
that does not belong to the node, the Source Address should be
that unicast address belonging to the node that will be most
helpful in diagnosing the error. For example, if the message is
a response to a packet forwarding action that cannot complete
successfully, the Source Address should be a unicast address
belonging to the interface on which the packet forwarding
failed.

(d) Otherwise, the node's routing table must be examined to
determine which interface will be used to transmit the message
to its destination, and a unicast address belonging to that
interface must be used as the Source Address of the message.

2.3 Message Checksum Calculation

The checksum is the 16-bit one's complement of the one's complement
sum of the entire ICMPv6 message starting with the ICMPv6 message
type field, prepended with a "pseudo-header" of IPv6 header fields,
as specified in [IPv6, section 8.1]. The Next Header value used in
the pseudo-header is 58. (NOTE: the inclusion of a pseudo-header in
the ICMPv6 checksum is a change from IPv4; see [IPv6] for the
rationale for this change.)

For computing the checksum, the checksum field is set to zero.

2.4 Message Processing Rules

Implementations MUST observe the following rules when processing
ICMPv6 messages (from [RFC-1122]):

(a) If an ICMPv6 error message of unknown type is received, it MUST
be passed to the upper layer.

(b) If an ICMPv6 informational message of unknown type is received,
it MUST be silently discarded.

(c) Every ICMPv6 error message (type < 128) includes as much of the
IPv6 offending (invoking) packet (the packet that caused the
error) as will fit without making the error message packet
exceed 576 octets.

(d) In those cases where the internet-layer protocol is required to
pass an ICMPv6 error message to the upper-layer protocol, the
upper-layer protocol type is extracted from the original packet
(contained in the body of the ICMPv6 error message) and used to
select the appropriate upper-layer protocol entity to handle the
error.

If the original packet had an unusually large amount of
extension headers, it is possible that the upper-layer protocol
type may not be present in the ICMPv6 message, due to truncation
of the original packet to meet the 576-octet limit. In that
case, the error message is silently dropped after any IPv6-layer
processing.

(e) An ICMPv6 error message MUST NOT be sent as a result of
receiving:

(e.1) an ICMPv6 error message, or

(e.2) a packet destined to an IPv6 multicast address (there are
two exceptions to this rule: (1) the Packet Too Big
Message - Section 3.2 - to allow Path MTU discovery to
work for IPv6 multicast, and (2) the Parameter Problem
Message, Code 2 - Section 3.4 - reporting an unrecognized
IPv6 option that has the Option Type highest-order two
bits set to 10), or

(e.3) a packet sent as a link-layer multicast, (the exception
from e.2 applies to this case too), or

(e.4) a packet sent as a link-layer broadcast, (the exception
from e.2 applies to this case too), or

(e.5) a packet whose source address does not uniquely identify
a single node -- e.g., the IPv6 Unspecified Address, an
IPv6 multicast address, or an address known by the ICMP
message sender to be an IPv6 anycast address.

(f) Finally, to each sender of an erroneous data packet, an IPv6
node MUST limit the rate of ICMPv6 error messages sent, in order
to limit the bandwidth and forwarding costs incurred by the
error messages when a generator of erroneous packets does not
respond to those error messages by ceasing its transmissions.

There are a variety of ways of implementing the rate-limiting
function, for example:

(f.1) Timer-based - for example, limiting the rate of
transmission of error messages to a given source, or to
any source, to at most once every T milliseconds.

(f.2) Bandwidth-based - for example, limiting the rate at
which error messages are sent from a particular interface
to some fraction F of the attached link's bandwidth.

The limit parameters (e.g., T or F in the above examples) MUST
be configurable for the node, with a conservative default value
(e.g., T = 1 second, NOT 0 seconds, or F = 2 percent, NOT 100
percent).

The following sections describe the message formats for the above
ICMPv6 messages.

3. ICMPv6 Error Messages

3.1 Destination Unreachable Message

0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Code | Checksum |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Unused |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| As much of invoking packet |
+ as will fit without the ICMPv6 packet +
| exceeding 576 octets |

IPv6 Fields:

Destination Address

Copied from the Source Address field of the invoking
packet.

ICMPv6 Fields:

Type 1

Code 0 - no route to destination
1 - communication with destination
administratively prohibited
2 - not a neighbor
3 - address unreachable
4 - port unreachable

Unused This field is unused for all code values.
It must be initialized to zero by the sender
and ignored by the receiver.
Description

A Destination Unreachable message SHOULD be generated by a router, or
by the IPv6 layer in the originating node, in response to a packet
that cannot be delivered to its destination address for reasons other
than congestion. (An ICMPv6 message MUST NOT be generated if a
packet is dropped due to congestion.)

If the reason for the failure to deliver is lack of a matching entry
in the forwarding node's routing table, the Code field is set to 0
(NOTE: this error can occur only in nodes that do not hold a "default
route" in their routing tables).

If the reason for the failure to deliver is administrative
prohibition, e.g., a "firewall filter", the Code field is set to 1.

If the reason for the failure to deliver is that the next destination
address in the Routing header is not a neighbor of the processing
node but the "strict" bit is set for that address, then the Code
field is set to 2.

If there is any other reason for the failure to deliver, e.g.,
inability to resolve the IPv6 destination address into a
corresponding link address, or a link-specific problem of some sort,
then the Code field is set to 3.

A destination node SHOULD send a Destination Unreachable message with
Code 4 in response to a packet for which the transport protocol
(e.g., UDP) has no listener, if that transport protocol has no
alternative means to inform the sender.

Upper layer notification

A node receiving the ICMPv6 Destination Unreachable message MUST
notify the upper-layer protocol.

3.2 Packet Too Big Message

0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Code | Checksum |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| MTU |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| As much of invoking packet |
+ as will fit without the ICMPv6 packet +
| exceeding 576 octets |

IPv6 Fields:

Destination Address

Copied from the Source Address field of the invoking
packet.

ICMPv6 Fields:

Type 2

Code 0

MTU The Maximum Transmission Unit of the next-hop link.

Description

A Packet Too Big MUST be sent by a router in response to a packet
that it cannot forward because the packet is larger than the MTU of
the outgoing link. The information in this message is used as part
of the Path MTU Discovery process [RFC-1191].

Sending a Packet Too Big Message makes an exception to one of the
rules of when to send an ICMPv6 error message, in that unlike other
messages, it is sent in response to a packet received with an IPv6
multicast destination address, or a link-layer multicast or link-
layer broadcast address.

Upper layer notification

An incoming Packet Too Big message MUST be passed to the upper-layer
protocol.

3.3 Time Exceeded Message

0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Code | Checksum |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Unused |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| As much of invoking packet |
+ as will fit without the ICMPv6 packet +
| exceeding 576 octets |

IPv6 Fields:

Destination Address
Copied from the Source Address field of the invoking
packet.

ICMPv6 Fields:

Type 3

Code 0 - hop limit exceeded in transit

1 - fragment reassembly time exceeded

Unused This field is unused for all code values.
It must be initialized to zero by the sender
and ignored by the receiver.

Description

If a router receives a packet with a Hop Limit of zero, or a router
decrements a packet's Hop Limit to zero, it MUST discard the packet
and send an ICMPv6 Time Exceeded message with Code 0 to the source of
the packet. This indicates either a routing loop or too small an
initial Hop Limit value.

The router sending an ICMPv6 Time Exceeded message with Code 0 SHOULD
consider the receiving interface of the packet as the interface on
which the packet forwarding failed in following rule (d) for
selecting the Source Address of the message.

Upper layer notification

An incoming Time Exceeded message MUST be passed to the upper-layer
protocol.

3.4 Parameter Problem Message

0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Code | Checksum |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Pointer |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| As much of invoking packet |
+ as will fit without the ICMPv6 packet +
| exceeding 576 octets |

IPv6 Fields:

Destination Address

Copied from the Source Address field of the invoking
packet.

ICMPv6 Fields:

Type 4

Code 0 - erroneous header field encountered

1 - unrecognized Next Header type encountered

2 - unrecognized IPv6 option encountered

Pointer Identifies the octet offset within the
invoking packet where the error was detected.

The pointer will point beyond the end of the ICMPv6
packet if the field in error is beyond what can fit
in the 576-byte limit of an ICMPv6 error message.

Description

If an IPv6 node processing a packet finds a problem with a field in
the IPv6 header or extension headers such that it cannot complete
processing the packet, it MUST discard the packet and SHOULD send an
ICMPv6 Parameter Problem message to the packet's source, indicating
the type and location of the problem.

The pointer identifies the octet of the original packet's header
where the error was detected. For example, an ICMPv6 message with
Type field = 4, Code field = 1, and Pointer field = 40 would indicate

that the IPv6 extension header following the IPv6 header of the
original packet holds an unrecognized Next Header field value.

Upper layer notification

A node receiving this ICMPv6 message MUST notify the upper-layer
protocol.

4. ICMPv6 Informational Messages

4.1 Echo Request Message

0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Code | Checksum |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Identifier | Sequence Number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Data ...
+-+-+-+-+-

IPv6 Fields:

Destination Address

Any legal IPv6 address.

ICMPv6 Fields:

Type 128

Code 0

Identifier An identifier to aid in matching Echo Replies
to this Echo Request. May be zero.

Sequence Number

A sequence number to aid in matching Echo Replies
to this Echo Request. May be zero.

Data Zero or more octets of arbitrary data.

Description

Every node MUST implement an ICMPv6 Echo responder function that
receives Echo Requests and sends corresponding Echo Replies. A node
SHOULD also implement an application-layer interface for sending Echo
Requests and receiving Echo Replies, for diagnostic purposes.

Upper layer notification

A node receiving this ICMPv6 message MAY notify the upper-layer
protocol.

4.2 Echo Reply Message

0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Code | Checksum |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Identifier | Sequence Number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Data ...
+-+-+-+-+-

IPv6 Fields:

Destination Address

Copied from the Source Address field of the invoking
Echo Request packet.

ICMPv6 Fields:

Type 129

Code 0

Identifier The identifier from the invoking Echo Request message.

Sequence The sequence number from the invoking Echo Request
Number message.

Data The data from the invoking Echo Request message.

Description

Every node MUST implement an ICMPv6 Echo responder function that
receives Echo Requests and sends corresponding Echo Replies. A node
SHOULD also implement an application-layer interface for sending Echo
Requests and receiving Echo Replies, for diagnostic purposes.

The source address of an Echo Reply sent in response to a unicast
Echo Request message MUST be the same as the destination address of
that Echo Request message.

An Echo Reply SHOULD be sent in response to an Echo Request message
sent to an IPv6 multicast address. The source address of the reply
MUST be a unicast address belonging to the interface on which the
multicast Echo Request message was received.

The data received in the ICMPv6 Echo Request message MUST be returned
entirely and unmodified in the ICMPv6 Echo Reply message, unless the
Echo Reply would exceed the MTU of the path back to the Echo
requester, in which case the data is truncated to fit that path MTU.

Upper layer notification

Echo Reply messages MUST be passed to the ICMPv6 user interface,
unless the corresponding Echo Request originated in the IP layer.

4.3 Group Membership Messages

The ICMPv6 Group Membership Messages have the following format:

0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Code | Checksum |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Maximum Response Delay | Unused |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
+ +
| Multicast |
+ +
| Address |
+ +
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

IPv6 Fields:

Destination Address

In a Group Membership Query message, the multicast
address of the group being queried, or the Link-Local
All-Nodes multicast address.

In a Group Membership Report or a Group Membership
Reduction message, the multicast address of the
group being reported or terminated.

Hop Limit 1

ICMPv6 Fields:

Type 130 - Group Membership Query
131 - Group Membership Report
132 - Group Membership Reduction

Code 0

Maximum Response Delay

In Query messages, the maximum time that responding
Report messages may be delayed, in milliseconds.

In Report and Reduction messages, this field is
is initialized to zero by the sender and ignored by
receivers.

Unused Initialized to zero by the sender; ignored by receivers.

Multicast Address

The address of the multicast group about which the
message is being sent. In Query messages, the Multicast
Address field may be zero, implying a query for all
groups.

Description

The ICMPv6 Group Membership messages are used to convey information
about multicast group membership from nodes to their neighboring
routers. The details of their usage is given in [RFC-1112].

5. References

[IPv6] Deering, S., and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version
6, Specification", RFC 1883, Xerox PARC, Ipsilon
Networks, December 1995.

[IPv6-ADDR] Hinden, R., and S. Deering, Editors, "IP Version 6
Addressing Architecture", RFC 1884, Ipsilon Networks,
Xerox PARC, December 1995.

[IPv6-DISC] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., and W. Simpson, "Neighbor
Discovery for IP Version 6 (IPv6)", Work in Progress.

[RFC-792] Postel, J., "Internet Control Message Protocol", STD 5,
RFC 792, USC/Information Sciences Institute, September
1981.

[RFC-1112] Deering, S., "Host Extensions for IP Multicasting", STD
5, RFC 1112, Stanford University, August 1989.

[RFC-1122] Braden, R., "Requirements for Internet Hosts -
Communication Layers", STD 3, RFC 1122, USC/Information
Sciences Institute, October 1989.

[RFC-1191] Mogul, J., and S. Deering, "Path MTU Discovery", RFC
1191, DECWRL, Stanford University, November 1990.

6. Acknowledgements

The document is derived from previous ICMP drafts of the SIPP and
IPng working group.

The IPng working group and particularly Robert Elz, Jim Bound, Bill
Simpson, Thomas Narten, Charlie Lynn, Bill Fink, and Scott Bradner
(in chronological order) provided extensive review information and
feedback.

7. Security Considerations

Security issues are not discussed in this memo.

Authors' Addresses:

Alex Conta Stephen Deering
Digital Equipment Corporation Xerox Palo Alto Research Center
110 Spitbrook Rd 3333 Coyote Hill Road
Nashua, NH 03062 Palo Alto, CA 94304

Phone: +1-603-881-0744 Phone: +1-415-812-4839
EMail: conta@zk3.dec.com EMail: deering@parc.xerox.com


RFC 2463 – Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6)

 
Network Working Group                                           A. Conta
Request for Comments: 2463 Lucent
Obsoletes: 1885 S. Deering
Category: Standards Track Cisco Systems
December 1998

Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6)
for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6)
Specification

Status of this Memo

This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1998). All Rights Reserved.

Abstract

This document specifies a set of Internet Control Message Protocol
(ICMP) messages for use with version 6 of the Internet Protocol
(IPv6).

Table of Contents

1. Introduction........................................2
2. ICMPv6 (ICMP for IPv6)..............................2
2.1 Message General Format.......................2
2.2 Message Source Address Determination.........3
2.3 Message Checksum Calculation.................4
2.4 Message Processing Rules.....................4
3. ICMPv6 Error Messages...............................6
3.1 Destination Unreachable Message..............6
3.2 Packet Too Big Message...................... 8
3.3 Time Exceeded Message....................... 9
3.4 Parameter Problem Message...................10
4. ICMPv6 Informational Messages......................11
4.1 Echo Request Message........................11
4.2 Echo Reply Message..........................12
5. Security Considerations............................13
6. References.........................................14
7. Acknowledgments....................................15
8. Authors' Addresses.................................16
Appendix A - Changes since RFC 1885...................17
Full Copyright Statement..............................18

1. Introduction


The Internet Protocol, version 6 (IPv6) is a new version of IP. IPv6
uses the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) as defined for IPv4
[RFC-792], with a number of changes. The resulting protocol is
called ICMPv6, and has an IPv6 Next Header value of 58.

This document describes the format of a set of control messages used
in ICMPv6. It does not describe the procedures for using these
messages to achieve functions like Path MTU discovery; such
procedures are described in other documents (e.g., [PMTU]). Other
documents may also introduce additional ICMPv6 message types, such as
Neighbor Discovery messages [IPv6-DISC], subject to the general rules
for ICMPv6 messages given in section 2 of this document.

Terminology defined in the IPv6 specification [IPv6] and the IPv6
Routing and Addressing specification [IPv6-ADDR] applies to this
document as well.

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC-2119].

2. ICMPv6 (ICMP for IPv6)


ICMPv6 is used by IPv6 nodes to report errors encountered in
processing packets, and to perform other internet-layer functions,
such as diagnostics (ICMPv6 "ping"). ICMPv6 is an integral part of
IPv6 and MUST be fully implemented by every IPv6 node.

2.1 Message General Format


ICMPv6 messages are grouped into two classes: error messages and
informational messages. Error messages are identified as such by
having a zero in the high-order bit of their message Type field
values. Thus, error messages have message Types from 0 to 127;
informational messages have message Types from 128 to 255.

This document defines the message formats for the following ICMPv6
messages:

ICMPv6 error messages:

1 Destination Unreachable (see section 3.1)
2 Packet Too Big (see section 3.2)
3 Time Exceeded (see section 3.3)
4 Parameter Problem (see section 3.4)

ICMPv6 informational messages:

128 Echo Request (see section 4.1)
129 Echo Reply (see section 4.2)

Every ICMPv6 message is preceded by an IPv6 header and zero or more
IPv6 extension headers. The ICMPv6 header is identified by a Next
Header value of 58 in the immediately preceding header. (NOTE: this
is different than the value used to identify ICMP for IPv4.)

The ICMPv6 messages have the following general format:

0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Code | Checksum |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
+ Message Body +
| |

The type field indicates the type of the message. Its value
determines the format of the remaining data.

The code field depends on the message type. It is used to create an
additional level of message granularity.

The checksum field is used to detect data corruption in the ICMPv6
message and parts of the IPv6 header.

2.2 Message Source Address Determination


A node that sends an ICMPv6 message has to determine both the Source
and Destination IPv6 Addresses in the IPv6 header before calculating
the checksum. If the node has more than one unicast address, it must
choose the Source Address of the message as follows:

(a) If the message is a response to a message sent to one of the
node's unicast addresses, the Source Address of the reply must
be that same address.

(b) If the message is a response to a message sent to a multicast or
anycast group in which the node is a member, the Source Address
of the reply must be a unicast address belonging to the
interface on which the multicast or anycast packet was received.

(c) If the message is a response to a message sent to an address
that does not belong to the node, the Source Address should be
that unicast address belonging to the node that will be most
helpful in diagnosing the error. For example, if the message is
a response to a packet forwarding action that cannot complete
successfully, the Source Address should be a unicast address
belonging to the interface on which the packet forwarding
failed.

(d) Otherwise, the node's routing table must be examined to
determine which interface will be used to transmit the message
to its destination, and a unicast address belonging to that
interface must be used as the Source Address of the message.

2.3 Message Checksum Calculation


The checksum is the 16-bit one's complement of the one's complement
sum of the entire ICMPv6 message starting with the ICMPv6 message
type field, prepended with a "pseudo-header" of IPv6 header fields,
as specified in [IPv6, section 8.1]. The Next Header value used in
the pseudo-header is 58. (NOTE: the inclusion of a pseudo-header in
the ICMPv6 checksum is a change from IPv4; see [IPv6] for the
rationale for this change.)

For computing the checksum, the checksum field is set to zero.

2.4 Message Processing Rules


Implementations MUST observe the following rules when processing
ICMPv6 messages (from [RFC-1122]):

(a) If an ICMPv6 error message of unknown type is received, it MUST
be passed to the upper layer.

(b) If an ICMPv6 informational message of unknown type is received,
it MUST be silently discarded.

(c) Every ICMPv6 error message (type < 128) includes as much of the
IPv6 offending (invoking) packet (the packet that caused the
error) as will fit without making the error message packet
exceed the minimum IPv6 MTU [IPv6].

(d) In those cases where the internet-layer protocol is required to
pass an ICMPv6 error message to the upper-layer process, the
upper-layer protocol type is extracted from the original packet
(contained in the body of the ICMPv6 error message) and used to
select the appropriate upper-layer process to handle the error.

If the original packet had an unusually large amount of
extension headers, it is possible that the upper-layer protocol
type may not be present in the ICMPv6 message, due to truncation
of the original packet to meet the minimum IPv6 MTU [IPv6]
limit. In that case, the error message is silently dropped
after any IPv6-layer processing.

(e) An ICMPv6 error message MUST NOT be sent as a result of
receiving:

(e.1) an ICMPv6 error message, or

(e.2) a packet destined to an IPv6 multicast address (there are
two exceptions to this rule: (1) the Packet Too Big
Message - Section 3.2 - to allow Path MTU discovery to
work for IPv6 multicast, and (2) the Parameter Problem
Message, Code 2 - Section 3.4 - reporting an unrecognized
IPv6 option that has the Option Type highest-order two
bits set to 10), or

(e.3) a packet sent as a link-layer multicast, (the exception
from e.2 applies to this case too), or

(e.4) a packet sent as a link-layer broadcast, (the exception
from e.2 applies to this case too), or

(e.5) a packet whose source address does not uniquely identify
a single node -- e.g., the IPv6 Unspecified Address, an
IPv6 multicast address, or an address known by the ICMP
message sender to be an IPv6 anycast address.

(f) Finally, in order to limit the bandwidth and forwarding costs
incurred sending ICMPv6 error messages, an IPv6 node MUST limit
the rate of ICMPv6 error messages it sends. This situation may
occur when a source sending a stream of erroneous packets fails
to heed the resulting ICMPv6 error messages. There are a
variety of ways of implementing the rate-limiting function, for
example:

(f.1) Timer-based - for example, limiting the rate of
transmission of error messages to a given source, or to
any source, to at most once every T milliseconds.

(f.2) Bandwidth-based - for example, limiting the rate at which
error messages are sent from a particular interface to
some fraction F of the attached link's bandwidth.

The limit parameters (e.g., T or F in the above examples) MUST
be configurable for the node, with a conservative default value
(e.g., T = 1 second, NOT 0 seconds, or F = 2 percent, NOT 100
percent).

The following sections describe the message formats for the above
ICMPv6 messages.

3. ICMPv6 Error Messages


3.1 Destination Unreachable Message


0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Code | Checksum |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Unused |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| As much of invoking packet |
+ as will fit without the ICMPv6 packet +
| exceeding the minimum IPv6 MTU [IPv6] |

IPv6 Fields:

Destination Address

Copied from the Source Address field of the invoking
packet.

ICMPv6 Fields:

Type 1

Code 0 - no route to destination
1 - communication with destination
administratively prohibited
2 - (not assigned)
3 - address unreachable
4 - port unreachable

Unused This field is unused for all code values.
It must be initialized to zero by the sender
and ignored by the receiver.

Description

A Destination Unreachable message SHOULD be generated by a router, or
by the IPv6 layer in the originating node, in response to a packet
that cannot be delivered to its destination address for reasons other
than congestion. (An ICMPv6 message MUST NOT be generated if a
packet is dropped due to congestion.)

If the reason for the failure to deliver is lack of a matching entry
in the forwarding node's routing table, the Code field is set to 0
(NOTE: this error can occur only in nodes that do not hold a "default
route" in their routing tables).

If the reason for the failure to deliver is administrative
prohibition, e.g., a "firewall filter", the Code field is set to 1.

If there is any other reason for the failure to deliver, e.g.,
inability to resolve the IPv6 destination address into a
corresponding link address, or a link-specific problem of some sort,
then the Code field is set to 3.

A destination node SHOULD send a Destination Unreachable message with
Code 4 in response to a packet for which the transport protocol
(e.g., UDP) has no listener, if that transport protocol has no
alternative means to inform the sender.

Upper layer notification

A node receiving the ICMPv6 Destination Unreachable message MUST
notify the upper-layer process.

3.2 Packet Too Big Message


0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Code | Checksum |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| MTU |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| As much of invoking packet |
+ as will fit without the ICMPv6 packet +
| exceeding the minimum IPv6 MTU [IPv6] |

IPv6 Fields:

Destination Address

Copied from the Source Address field of the invoking
packet.

ICMPv6 Fields:

Type 2

Code Set to 0 (zero) by the sender and ignored by the
receiver

MTU The Maximum Transmission Unit of the next-hop link.

Description

A Packet Too Big MUST be sent by a router in response to a packet
that it cannot forward because the packet is larger than the MTU of
the outgoing link. The information in this message is used as part
of the Path MTU Discovery process [PMTU].

Sending a Packet Too Big Message makes an exception to one of the
rules of when to send an ICMPv6 error message, in that unlike other
messages, it is sent in response to a packet received with an IPv6
multicast destination address, or a link-layer multicast or link-
layer broadcast address.

Upper layer notification

An incoming Packet Too Big message MUST be passed to the upper-layer
process.

3.3 Time Exceeded Message


0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Code | Checksum |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Unused |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| As much of invoking packet |
+ as will fit without the ICMPv6 packet +
| exceeding the minimum IPv6 MTU [IPv6] |

IPv6 Fields:

Destination Address
Copied from the Source Address field of the invoking
packet.

ICMPv6 Fields:

Type 3

Code 0 - hop limit exceeded in transit

1 - fragment reassembly time exceeded

Unused This field is unused for all code values.
It must be initialized to zero by the sender
and ignored by the receiver.

Description

If a router receives a packet with a Hop Limit of zero, or a router
decrements a packet's Hop Limit to zero, it MUST discard the packet
and send an ICMPv6 Time Exceeded message with Code 0 to the source of
the packet. This indicates either a routing loop or too small an
initial Hop Limit value.

The rules for selecting the Source Address of this message are
defined in section 2.2.

Upper layer notification

An incoming Time Exceeded message MUST be passed to the upper-layer
process.

3.4 Parameter Problem Message


0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Code | Checksum |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Pointer |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| As much of invoking packet |
+ as will fit without the ICMPv6 packet +
| exceeding the minimum IPv6 MTU [IPv6] |

IPv6 Fields:

Destination Address

Copied from the Source Address field of the invoking
packet.

ICMPv6 Fields:

Type 4

Code 0 - erroneous header field encountered

1 - unrecognized Next Header type encountered

2 - unrecognized IPv6 option encountered

Pointer Identifies the octet offset within the
invoking packet where the error was detected.

The pointer will point beyond the end of the ICMPv6
packet if the field in error is beyond what can fit
in the maximum size of an ICMPv6 error message.

Description

If an IPv6 node processing a packet finds a problem with a field in
the IPv6 header or extension headers such that it cannot complete
processing the packet, it MUST discard the packet and SHOULD send an
ICMPv6 Parameter Problem message to the packet's source, indicating
the type and location of the problem.

The pointer identifies the octet of the original packet's header
where the error was detected. For example, an ICMPv6 message with
Type field = 4, Code field = 1, and Pointer field = 40 would indicate

that the IPv6 extension header following the IPv6 header of the
original packet holds an unrecognized Next Header field value.

Upper layer notification

A node receiving this ICMPv6 message MUST notify the upper-layer
process.

4. ICMPv6 Informational Messages


4.1 Echo Request Message


0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Code | Checksum |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Identifier | Sequence Number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Data ...
+-+-+-+-+-

IPv6 Fields:

Destination Address

Any legal IPv6 address.

ICMPv6 Fields:

Type 128

Code 0

Identifier An identifier to aid in matching Echo Replies
to this Echo Request. May be zero.

Sequence Number

A sequence number to aid in matching Echo Replies
to this Echo Request. May be zero.

Data Zero or more octets of arbitrary data.

Description

Every node MUST implement an ICMPv6 Echo responder function that
receives Echo Requests and sends corresponding Echo Replies. A node
SHOULD also implement an application-layer interface for sending Echo
Requests and receiving Echo Replies, for diagnostic purposes.

Upper layer notification

Echo Request messages MAY be passed to processes receiving ICMP
messages.

4.2 Echo Reply Message


0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Code | Checksum |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Identifier | Sequence Number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Data ...
+-+-+-+-+-

IPv6 Fields:

Destination Address

Copied from the Source Address field of the invoking
Echo Request packet.

ICMPv6 Fields:

Type 129

Code 0

Identifier The identifier from the invoking Echo Request message.

Sequence The sequence number from the invoking Echo Request
Number message.

Data The data from the invoking Echo Request message.

Description

Every node MUST implement an ICMPv6 Echo responder function that
receives Echo Requests and sends corresponding Echo Replies. A node
SHOULD also implement an application-layer interface for sending Echo
Requests and receiving Echo Replies, for diagnostic purposes.

The source address of an Echo Reply sent in response to a unicast
Echo Request message MUST be the same as the destination address of
that Echo Request message.

An Echo Reply SHOULD be sent in response to an Echo Request message
sent to an IPv6 multicast address. The source address of the reply
MUST be a unicast address belonging to the interface on which the
multicast Echo Request message was received.

The data received in the ICMPv6 Echo Request message MUST be returned
entirely and unmodified in the ICMPv6 Echo Reply message.

Upper layer notification

Echo Reply messages MUST be passed to the process that originated an
Echo Request message. It may be passed to processes that did not
originate the Echo Request message.

5. Security Considerations


5.1 Authentication and Encryption of ICMP messages


ICMP protocol packet exchanges can be authenticated using the IP
Authentication Header [IPv6-AUTH]. A node SHOULD include an
Authentication Header when sending ICMP messages if a security
association for use with the IP Authentication Header exists for the
destination address. The security associations may have been created
through manual configuration or through the operation of some key
management protocol.

Received Authentication Headers in ICMP packets MUST be verified for
correctness and packets with incorrect authentication MUST be ignored
and discarded.

It SHOULD be possible for the system administrator to configure a
node to ignore any ICMP messages that are not authenticated using
either the Authentication Header or Encapsulating Security Payload.
Such a switch SHOULD default to allowing unauthenticated messages.

Confidentiality issues are addressed by the IP Security Architecture
and the IP Encapsulating Security Payload documents [IPv6-SA, IPv6-
ESP].

5.2 ICMP Attacks


ICMP messages may be subject to various attacks. A complete
discussion can be found in the IP Security Architecture [IPv6-SA]. A
brief discussion of such attacks and their prevention is as follows:

1. ICMP messages may be subject to actions intended to cause the
receiver believe the message came from a different source than the
message originator. The protection against this attack can be
achieved by applying the IPv6 Authentication mechanism [IPv6-Auth]
to the ICMP message.

2. ICMP messages may be subject to actions intended to cause the
message or the reply to it go to a destination different than the
message originator's intention. The ICMP checksum calculation
provides a protection mechanism against changes by a malicious
interceptor in the destination and source address of the IP packet
carrying that message, provided the ICMP checksum field is
protected against change by authentication [IPv6-Auth] or
encryption [IPv6-ESP] of the ICMP message.

3. ICMP messages may be subject to changes in the message fields, or
payload. The authentication [IPv6-Auth] or encryption [IPv6-ESP]
of the ICMP message is a protection against such actions.

4. ICMP messages may be used as attempts to perform denial of service
attacks by sending back to back erroneous IP packets. An
implementation that correctly followed section 2.4, paragraph (f)
of this specifications, would be protected by the ICMP error rate
limiting mechanism.

6. References


[IPv6] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version
6, (IPv6) Specification", RFC 2460, December 1998.

[IPv6-ADDR] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing
Architecture", RFC 2373, July 1998.

[IPv6-DISC] Narten, T., Nordmark, E. and W. Simpson, "Neighbor
Discovery for IP Version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 2461, December
1998.

[RFC-792] Postel, J., "Internet Control Message Protocol", STD 5,
RFC 792, September 1981.

[RFC-1122] Braden, R., "Requirements for Internet Hosts -
Communication Layers", STD 5, RFC 1122, August 1989.

[PMTU] McCann, J., Deering, S. and J. Mogul, "Path MTU
Discovery for IP version 6", RFC 1981, August 1996.

[RFC-2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

[IPv6-SA] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998.

[IPv6-Auth] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "IP Authentication Header",
RFC 2402, November 1998.

[IPv6-ESP] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "IP Encapsulating Security
Protocol (ESP)", RFC 2406, November 1998.

7. Acknowledgments


The document is derived from previous ICMP drafts of the SIPP and
IPng working group.

The IPng working group and particularly Robert Elz, Jim Bound, Bill
Simpson, Thomas Narten, Charlie Lynn, Bill Fink, Scott Bradner,
Dimitri Haskin, and Bob Hinden (in chronological order) provided
extensive review information and feedback.

8. Authors' Addresses


Alex Conta
Lucent Technologies Inc.
300 Baker Ave, Suite 100
Concord, MA 01742
USA

Phone: +1 978 287-2842
EMail: aconta@lucent.com

Stephen Deering
Cisco Systems, Inc.
170 West Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA 95134-1706
USA

Phone: +1 408 527-8213
EMail: deering@cisco.com

Appendix A - Changes from RFC 1885


Version 2-02

- Excluded mentioning informational replies from paragraph (f.2) of
section 2.4.
- In "Upper layer notification" sections changed "upper-layer
protocol" and "User Interface" to "process".
- Changed section 5.2, item 2 and 3 to also refer to AH
authentication.
- Removed item 5. from section 5.2 on denial of service attacks.
- Updated phone numbers and Email addresses in the "Authors'
Addresses" section.

Version 2-01

- Replaced all references to "576 octets" as the maximum for an ICMP
message size with "minimum IPv6 MTU" as defined by the base IPv6
specification.
- Removed rate control from informational messages.
- Added requirement that receivers ignore Code value in Packet Too
Big message.
- Removed "Not a Neighbor" (code 2) from destination unreachable
message.
- Fixed typos and update references.

Version 2-00

- Applied rate control to informational messages
- Removed section 2.4 on Group Management ICMP messages
- Removed references to IGMP in Abstract and Section 1.
- Updated references to other IPv6 documents
- Removed references to RFC-1112 in Abstract, and Section 1, and to
RFC-1191 in section 1, and section 3.2
- Added security section
- Added Appendix A - changes

Full Copyright Statement


Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1998). All Rights Reserved.

This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this
document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
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TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
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MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.


RFC 2402 – IP Authentication Header


Network Working Group S. Kent
Request for Comments: 2402 BBN Corp
Obsoletes: 1826 R. Atkinson
Category: Standards Track @Home Network
November 1998

IP Authentication Header

Status of this Memo

This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1998). All Rights Reserved.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction......................................................2
2. Authentication Header Format......................................3
2.1 Next Header...................................................4
2.2 Payload Length................................................4
2.3 Reserved......................................................4
2.4 Security Parameters Index (SPI)...............................4
2.5 Sequence Number...............................................5
2.6 Authentication Data ..........................................5
3. Authentication Header Processing..................................5
3.1 Authentication Header Location...............................5
3.2 Authentication Algorithms....................................7
3.3 Outbound Packet Processing...................................8
3.3.1 Security Association Lookup.............................8
3.3.2 Sequence Number Generation..............................8
3.3.3 Integrity Check Value Calculation.......................9
3.3.3.1 Handling Mutable Fields............................9
3.3.3.1.1 ICV Computation for IPv4.....................10
3.3.3.1.1.1 Base Header Fields.......................10
3.3.3.1.1.2 Options..................................11
3.3.3.1.2 ICV Computation for IPv6.....................11
3.3.3.1.2.1 Base Header Fields.......................11
3.3.3.1.2.2 Extension Headers Containing Options.....11
3.3.3.1.2.3 Extension Headers Not Containing Options.11
3.3.3.2 Padding...........................................12
3.3.3.2.1 Authentication Data Padding..................12

3.3.3.2.2 Implicit Packet Padding......................12
3.3.4 Fragmentation..........................................12
3.4 Inbound Packet Processing...................................13
3.4.1 Reassembly.............................................13
3.4.2 Security Association Lookup............................13
3.4.3 Sequence Number Verification...........................13
3.4.4 Integrity Check Value Verification.....................15
4. Auditing.........................................................15
5. Conformance Requirements.........................................16
6. Security Considerations..........................................16
7. Differences from RFC 1826........................................16
Acknowledgements....................................................17
Appendix A -- Mutability of IP Options/Extension Headers............18
A1. IPv4 Options.................................................18
A2. IPv6 Extension Headers.......................................19
References..........................................................20
Disclaimer..........................................................21
Author Information..................................................22
Full Copyright Statement............................................22

1. Introduction

The IP Authentication Header (AH) is used to provide connectionless
integrity and data origin authentication for IP datagrams (hereafter
referred to as just "authentication"), and to provide protection
against replays. This latter, optional service may be selected, by
the receiver, when a Security Association is established. (Although
the default calls for the sender to increment the Sequence Number
used for anti-replay, the service is effective only if the receiver
checks the Sequence Number.) AH provides authentication for as much
of the IP header as possible, as well as for upper level protocol
data. However, some IP header fields may change in transit and the
value of these fields, when the packet arrives at the receiver, may
not be predictable by the sender. The values of such fields cannot
be protected by AH. Thus the protection provided to the IP header by
AH is somewhat piecemeal.

AH may be applied alone, in combination with the IP Encapsulating
Security Payload (ESP) [KA97b], or in a nested fashion through the
use of tunnel mode (see "Security Architecture for the Internet
Protocol" [KA97a], hereafter referred to as the Security Architecture
document). Security services can be provided between a pair of
communicating hosts, between a pair of communicating security
gateways, or between a security gateway and a host. ESP may be used
to provide the same security services, and it also provides a
confidentiality (encryption) service. The primary difference between
the authentication provided by ESP and AH is the extent of the
coverage. Specifically, ESP does not protect any IP header fields

unless those fields are encapsulated by ESP (tunnel mode). For more
details on how to use AH and ESP in various network environments, see
the Security Architecture document [KA97a].

It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts
described in the Security Architecture document. In particular, the
reader should be familiar with the definitions of security services
offered by AH and ESP, the concept of Security Associations, the ways
in which AH can be used in conjunction with ESP, and the different
key management options available for AH and ESP. (With regard to the
last topic, the current key management options required for both AH
and ESP are manual keying and automated keying via IKE [HC98].)

The keywords MUST, MUST NOT, REQUIRED, SHALL, SHALL NOT, SHOULD,
SHOULD NOT, RECOMMENDED, MAY, and OPTIONAL, when they appear in this
document, are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [Bra97].

2. Authentication Header Format

The protocol header (IPv4, IPv6, or Extension) immediately preceding
the AH header will contain the value 51 in its Protocol (IPv4) or
Next Header (IPv6, Extension) field [STD-2].

0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Next Header | Payload Len | RESERVED |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Security Parameters Index (SPI) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Sequence Number Field |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
+ Authentication Data (variable) |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

The following subsections define the fields that comprise the AH
format. All the fields described here are mandatory, i.e., they are
always present in the AH format and are included in the Integrity
Check Value (ICV) computation (see Sections 2.6 and 3.3.3).

2.1 Next Header

The Next Header is an 8-bit field that identifies the type of the
next payload after the Authentication Header. The value of this
field is chosen from the set of IP Protocol Numbers defined in the
most recent "Assigned Numbers" [STD-2] RFC from the Internet Assigned
Numbers Authority (IANA).

2.2 Payload Length

This 8-bit field specifies the length of AH in 32-bit words (4-byte
units), minus "2". (All IPv6 extension headers, as per RFC 1883,
encode the "Hdr Ext Len" field by first subtracting 1 (64-bit word)
from the header length (measured in 64-bit words). AH is an IPv6
extension header. However, since its length is measured in 32-bit
words, the "Payload Length" is calculated by subtracting 2 (32 bit
words).) In the "standard" case of a 96-bit authentication value
plus the 3 32-bit word fixed portion, this length field will be "4".
A "null" authentication algorithm may be used only for debugging
purposes. Its use would result in a "1" value for this field for
IPv4 or a "2" for IPv6, as there would be no corresponding
Authentication Data field (see Section 3.3.3.2.1 on "Authentication
Data Padding").

2.3 Reserved

This 16-bit field is reserved for future use. It MUST be set to
"zero." (Note that the value is included in the Authentication Data
calculation, but is otherwise ignored by the recipient.)

2.4 Security Parameters Index (SPI)

The SPI is an arbitrary 32-bit value that, in combination with the
destination IP address and security protocol (AH), uniquely
identifies the Security Association for this datagram. The set of
SPI values in the range 1 through 255 are reserved by the Internet
Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) for future use; a reserved SPI
value will not normally be assigned by IANA unless the use of the
assigned SPI value is specified in an RFC. It is ordinarily selected
by the destination system upon establishment of an SA (see the
Security Architecture document for more details).

The SPI value of zero (0) is reserved for local, implementation-
specific use and MUST NOT be sent on the wire. For example, a key
management implementation MAY use the zero SPI value to mean "No
Security Association Exists" during the period when the IPsec
implementation has requested that its key management entity establish
a new SA, but the SA has not yet been established.

2.5 Sequence Number

This unsigned 32-bit field contains a monotonically increasing
counter value (sequence number). It is mandatory and is always
present even if the receiver does not elect to enable the anti-replay
service for a specific SA. Processing of the Sequence Number field
is at the discretion of the receiver, i.e., the sender MUST always
transmit this field, but the receiver need not act upon it (see the
discussion of Sequence Number Verification in the "Inbound Packet
Processing" section below).

The sender's counter and the receiver's counter are initialized to 0
when an SA is established. (The first packet sent using a given SA
will have a Sequence Number of 1; see Section 3.3.2 for more details
on how the Sequence Number is generated.) If anti-replay is enabled
(the default), the transmitted Sequence Number must never be allowed
to cycle. Thus, the sender's counter and the receiver's counter MUST
be reset (by establishing a new SA and thus a new key) prior to the
transmission of the 2^32nd packet on an SA.

2.6 Authentication Data

This is a variable-length field that contains the Integrity Check
Value (ICV) for this packet. The field must be an integral multiple
of 32 bits in length. The details of the ICV computation are
described in Section 3.3.2 below. This field may include explicit
padding. This padding is included to ensure that the length of the
AH header is an integral multiple of 32 bits (IPv4) or 64 bits
(IPv6). All implementations MUST support such padding. Details of
how to compute the required padding length are provided below. The
authentication algorithm specification MUST specify the length of the
ICV and the comparison rules and processing steps for validation.

3. Authentication Header Processing

3.1 Authentication Header Location

Like ESP, AH may be employed in two ways: transport mode or tunnel
mode. The former mode is applicable only to host implementations and
provides protection for upper layer protocols, in addition to
selected IP header fields. (In this mode, note that for "bump-in-
the-stack" or "bump-in-the-wire" implementations, as defined in the
Security Architecture document, inbound and outbound IP fragments may
require an IPsec implementation to perform extra IP
reassembly/fragmentation in order to both conform to this
specification and provide transparent IPsec support. Special care is
required to perform such operations within these implementations when
multiple interfaces are in use.)

In transport mode, AH is inserted after the IP header and before an
upper layer protocol, e.g., TCP, UDP, ICMP, etc. or before any other
IPsec headers that have already been inserted. In the context of
IPv4, this calls for placing AH after the IP header (and any options
that it contains), but before the upper layer protocol. (Note that
the term "transport" mode should not be misconstrued as restricting
its use to TCP and UDP. For example, an ICMP message MAY be sent
using either "transport" mode or "tunnel" mode.) The following
diagram illustrates AH transport mode positioning for a typical IPv4
packet, on a "before and after" basis.

BEFORE APPLYING AH
----------------------------
IPv4 |orig IP hdr | | |
|(any options)| TCP | Data |
----------------------------

AFTER APPLYING AH
---------------------------------
IPv4 |orig IP hdr | | | |
|(any options)| AH | TCP | Data |
---------------------------------
|<------- authenticated ------->|
except for mutable fields

In the IPv6 context, AH is viewed as an end-to-end payload, and thus
should appear after hop-by-hop, routing, and fragmentation extension
headers. The destination options extension header(s) could appear
either before or after the AH header depending on the semantics
desired. The following diagram illustrates AH transport mode
positioning for a typical IPv6 packet.

BEFORE APPLYING AH
---------------------------------------
IPv6 | | ext hdrs | | |
| orig IP hdr |if present| TCP | Data |
---------------------------------------

AFTER APPLYING AH
------------------------------------------------------------
IPv6 | |hop-by-hop, dest*, | | dest | | |
|orig IP hdr |routing, fragment. | AH | opt* | TCP | Data |
------------------------------------------------------------
|<---- authenticated except for mutable fields ----------->|

* = if present, could be before AH, after AH, or both

ESP and AH headers can be combined in a variety of modes. The IPsec
Architecture document describes the combinations of security
associations that must be supported.

Tunnel mode AH may be employed in either hosts or security gateways
(or in so-called "bump-in-the-stack" or "bump-in-the-wire"
implementations, as defined in the Security Architecture document).
When AH is implemented in a security gateway (to protect transit
traffic), tunnel mode must be used. In tunnel mode, the "inner" IP
header carries the ultimate source and destination addresses, while
an "outer" IP header may contain distinct IP addresses, e.g.,
addresses of security gateways. In tunnel mode, AH protects the
entire inner IP packet, including the entire inner IP header. The
position of AH in tunnel mode, relative to the outer IP header, is
the same as for AH in transport mode. The following diagram
illustrates AH tunnel mode positioning for typical IPv4 and IPv6
packets.

------------------------------------------------
IPv4 | new IP hdr* | | orig IP hdr* | | |
|(any options)| AH | (any options) |TCP | Data |
------------------------------------------------
|<- authenticated except for mutable fields -->|
| in the new IP hdr |

--------------------------------------------------------------
IPv6 | | ext hdrs*| | | ext hdrs*| | |
|new IP hdr*|if present| AH |orig IP hdr*|if present|TCP|Data|
--------------------------------------------------------------
|<-- authenticated except for mutable fields in new IP hdr ->|

* = construction of outer IP hdr/extensions and modification
of inner IP hdr/extensions is discussed below.

3.2 Authentication Algorithms

The authentication algorithm employed for the ICV computation is
specified by the SA. For point-to-point communication, suitable
authentication algorithms include keyed Message Authentication Codes
(MACs) based on symmetric encryption algorithms (e.g., DES) or on
one-way hash functions (e.g., MD5 or SHA-1). For multicast
communication, one-way hash algorithms combined with asymmetric
signature algorithms are appropriate, though performance and space
considerations currently preclude use of such algorithms. The
mandatory-to-implement authentication algorithms are described in
Section 5 "Conformance Requirements". Other algorithms MAY be
supported.

3.3 Outbound Packet Processing

In transport mode, the sender inserts the AH header after the IP
header and before an upper layer protocol header, as described above.
In tunnel mode, the outer and inner IP header/extensions can be
inter-related in a variety of ways. The construction of the outer IP
header/extensions during the encapsulation process is described in
the Security Architecture document.

If there is more than one IPsec header/extension required, the order
of the application of the security headers MUST be defined by
security policy. For simplicity of processing, each IPsec header
SHOULD ignore the existence (i.e., not zero the contents or try to
predict the contents) of IPsec headers to be applied later. (While a
native IP or bump-in-the-stack implementation could predict the
contents of later IPsec headers that it applies itself, it won't be
possible for it to predict any IPsec headers added by a bump-in-the-
wire implementation between the host and the network.)

3.3.1 Security Association Lookup

AH is applied to an outbound packet only after an IPsec
implementation determines that the packet is associated with an SA
that calls for AH processing. The process of determining what, if
any, IPsec processing is applied to outbound traffic is described in
the Security Architecture document.

3.3.2 Sequence Number Generation

The sender's counter is initialized to 0 when an SA is established.
The sender increments the Sequence Number for this SA and inserts the
new value into the Sequence Number Field. Thus the first packet sent
using a given SA will have a Sequence Number of 1.

If anti-replay is enabled (the default), the sender checks to ensure
that the counter has not cycled before inserting the new value in the
Sequence Number field. In other words, the sender MUST NOT send a
packet on an SA if doing so would cause the Sequence Number to cycle.
An attempt to transmit a packet that would result in Sequence Number
overflow is an auditable event. (Note that this approach to Sequence
Number management does not require use of modular arithmetic.)

The sender assumes anti-replay is enabled as a default, unless
otherwise notified by the receiver (see 3.4.3). Thus, if the counter
has cycled, the sender will set up a new SA and key (unless the SA
was configured with manual key management).

If anti-replay is disabled, the sender does not need to monitor or
reset the counter, e.g., in the case of manual key management (see
Section 5.) However, the sender still increments the counter and when
it reaches the maximum value, the counter rolls over back to zero.

3.3.3 Integrity Check Value Calculation

The AH ICV is computed over:
o IP header fields that are either immutable in transit or
that are predictable in value upon arrival at the endpoint
for the AH SA
o the AH header (Next Header, Payload Len, Reserved, SPI,
Sequence Number, and the Authentication Data (which is set
to zero for this computation), and explicit padding bytes
(if any))
o the upper level protocol data, which is assumed to be
immutable in transit

3.3.3.1 Handling Mutable Fields

If a field may be modified during transit, the value of the field is
set to zero for purposes of the ICV computation. If a field is
mutable, but its value at the (IPsec) receiver is predictable, then
that value is inserted into the field for purposes of the ICV
calculation. The Authentication Data field is also set to zero in
preparation for this computation. Note that by replacing each
field's value with zero, rather than omitting the field, alignment is
preserved for the ICV calculation. Also, the zero-fill approach
ensures that the length of the fields that are so handled cannot be
changed during transit, even though their contents are not explicitly
covered by the ICV.

As a new extension header or IPv4 option is created, it will be
defined in its own RFC and SHOULD include (in the Security
Considerations section) directions for how it should be handled when
calculating the AH ICV. If the IP (v4 or v6) implementation
encounters an extension header that it does not recognize, it will
discard the packet and send an ICMP message. IPsec will never see
the packet. If the IPsec implementation encounters an IPv4 option
that it does not recognize, it should zero the whole option, using
the second byte of the option as the length. IPv6 options (in
Destination extension headers or Hop by Hop extension header) contain
a flag indicating mutability, which determines appropriate processing
for such options.

3.3.3.1.1 ICV Computation for IPv4

3.3.3.1.1.1 Base Header Fields

The IPv4 base header fields are classified as follows:

Immutable
Version
Internet Header Length
Total Length
Identification
Protocol (This should be the value for AH.)
Source Address
Destination Address (without loose or strict source routing)

Mutable but predictable
Destination Address (with loose or strict source routing)

Mutable (zeroed prior to ICV calculation)
Type of Service (TOS)
Flags
Fragment Offset
Time to Live (TTL)
Header Checksum

TOS -- This field is excluded because some routers are known to
change the value of this field, even though the IP
specification does not consider TOS to be a mutable header
field.

Flags -- This field is excluded since an intermediate router might
set the DF bit, even if the source did not select it.

Fragment Offset -- Since AH is applied only to non-fragmented IP
packets, the Offset Field must always be zero, and thus it
is excluded (even though it is predictable).

TTL -- This is changed en-route as a normal course of processing
by routers, and thus its value at the receiver is not
predictable by the sender.

Header Checksum -- This will change if any of these other fields
changes, and thus its value upon reception cannot be
predicted by the sender.

3.3.3.1.1.2 Options

For IPv4 (unlike IPv6), there is no mechanism for tagging options as
mutable in transit. Hence the IPv4 options are explicitly listed in
Appendix A and classified as immutable, mutable but predictable, or
mutable. For IPv4, the entire option is viewed as a unit; so even
though the type and length fields within most options are immutable
in transit, if an option is classified as mutable, the entire option
is zeroed for ICV computation purposes.

3.3.3.1.2 ICV Computation for IPv6

3.3.3.1.2.1 Base Header Fields

The IPv6 base header fields are classified as follows:

Immutable
Version
Payload Length
Next Header (This should be the value for AH.)
Source Address
Destination Address (without Routing Extension Header)

Mutable but predictable
Destination Address (with Routing Extension Header)

Mutable (zeroed prior to ICV calculation)
Class
Flow Label
Hop Limit

3.3.3.1.2.2 Extension Headers Containing Options

IPv6 options in the Hop-by-Hop and Destination Extension Headers
contain a bit that indicates whether the option might change
(unpredictably) during transit. For any option for which contents
may change en-route, the entire "Option Data" field must be treated
as zero-valued octets when computing or verifying the ICV. The
Option Type and Opt Data Len are included in the ICV calculation.
All options for which the bit indicates immutability are included in
the ICV calculation. See the IPv6 specification [DH95] for more
information.

3.3.3.1.2.3 Extension Headers Not Containing Options

The IPv6 extension headers that do not contain options are explicitly
listed in Appendix A and classified as immutable, mutable but
predictable, or mutable.

3.3.3.2 Padding

3.3.3.2.1 Authentication Data Padding

As mentioned in section 2.6, the Authentication Data field explicitly
includes padding to ensure that the AH header is a multiple of 32
bits (IPv4) or 64 bits (IPv6). If padding is required, its length is
determined by two factors:

- the length of the ICV
- the IP protocol version (v4 or v6)

For example, if the output of the selected algorithm is 96-bits, no
padding is required for either IPv4 or for IPv6. However, if a
different length ICV is generated, due to use of a different
algorithm, then padding may be required depending on the length and
IP protocol version. The content of the padding field is arbitrarily
selected by the sender. (The padding is arbitrary, but need not be
random to achieve security.) These padding bytes are included in the
Authentication Data calculation, counted as part of the Payload
Length, and transmitted at the end of the Authentication Data field
to enable the receiver to perform the ICV calculation.

3.3.3.2.2 Implicit Packet Padding

For some authentication algorithms, the byte string over which the
ICV computation is performed must be a multiple of a blocksize
specified by the algorithm. If the IP packet length (including AH)
does not match the blocksize requirements for the algorithm, implicit
padding MUST be appended to the end of the packet, prior to ICV
computation. The padding octets MUST have a value of zero. The
blocksize (and hence the length of the padding) is specified by the
algorithm specification. This padding is not transmitted with the
packet. Note that MD5 and SHA-1 are viewed as having a 1-byte
blocksize because of their internal padding conventions.

3.3.4 Fragmentation

If required, IP fragmentation occurs after AH processing within an
IPsec implementation. Thus, transport mode AH is applied only to
whole IP datagrams (not to IP fragments). An IP packet to which AH
has been applied may itself be fragmented by routers en route, and
such fragments must be reassembled prior to AH processing at a
receiver. In tunnel mode, AH is applied to an IP packet, the payload
of which may be a fragmented IP packet. For example, a security
gateway or a "bump-in-the-stack" or "bump-in-the-wire" IPsec
implementation (see the Security Architecture document for details)
may apply tunnel mode AH to such fragments.

3.4 Inbound Packet Processing

If there is more than one IPsec header/extension present, the
processing for each one ignores (does not zero, does not use) any
IPsec headers applied subsequent to the header being processed.

3.4.1 Reassembly

If required, reassembly is performed prior to AH processing. If a
packet offered to AH for processing appears to be an IP fragment,
i.e., the OFFSET field is non-zero or the MORE FRAGMENTS flag is set,
the receiver MUST discard the packet; this is an auditable event. The
audit log entry for this event SHOULD include the SPI value,
date/time, Source Address, Destination Address, and (in IPv6) the
Flow ID.

NOTE: For packet reassembly, the current IPv4 spec does NOT require
either the zero'ing of the OFFSET field or the clearing of the MORE
FRAGMENTS flag. In order for a reassembled packet to be processed by
IPsec (as opposed to discarded as an apparent fragment), the IP code
must do these two things after it reassembles a packet.

3.4.2 Security Association Lookup

Upon receipt of a packet containing an IP Authentication Header, the
receiver determines the appropriate (unidirectional) SA, based on the
destination IP address, security protocol (AH), and the SPI. (This
process is described in more detail in the Security Architecture
document.) The SA indicates whether the Sequence Number field will
be checked, specifies the algorithm(s) employed for ICV computation,
and indicates the key(s) required to validate the ICV.

If no valid Security Association exists for this session (e.g., the
receiver has no key), the receiver MUST discard the packet; this is
an auditable event. The audit log entry for this event SHOULD
include the SPI value, date/time, Source Address, Destination
Address, and (in IPv6) the Flow ID.

3.4.3 Sequence Number Verification

All AH implementations MUST support the anti-replay service, though
its use may be enabled or disabled by the receiver on a per-SA basis.
(Note that there are no provisions for managing transmitted Sequence
Number values among multiple senders directing traffic to a single SA
(irrespective of whether the destination address is unicast,
broadcast, or multicast). Thus the anti-replay service SHOULD NOT be
used in a multi-sender environment that employs a single SA.)

If the receiver does not enable anti-replay for an SA, no inbound
checks are performed on the Sequence Number. However, from the
perspective of the sender, the default is to assume that anti-replay
is enabled at the receiver. To avoid having the sender do
unnecessary sequence number monitoring and SA setup (see section
3.3.2), if an SA establishment protocol such as IKE is employed, the
receiver SHOULD notify the sender, during SA establishment, if the
receiver will not provide anti-replay protection.

If the receiver has enabled the anti-replay service for this SA, the
receiver packet counter for the SA MUST be initialized to zero when
the SA is established. For each received packet, the receiver MUST
verify that the packet contains a Sequence Number that does not
duplicate the Sequence Number of any other packets received during
the life of this SA. This SHOULD be the first AH check applied to a
packet after it has been matched to an SA, to speed rejection of
duplicate packets.

Duplicates are rejected through the use of a sliding receive window.
(How the window is implemented is a local matter, but the following
text describes the functionality that the implementation must
exhibit.) A MINIMUM window size of 32 MUST be supported; but a
window size of 64 is preferred and SHOULD be employed as the default.
Another window size (larger than the MINIMUM) MAY be chosen by the
receiver. (The receiver does NOT notify the sender of the window
size.)

The "right" edge of the window represents the highest, validated
Sequence Number value received on this SA. Packets that contain
Sequence Numbers lower than the "left" edge of the window are
rejected. Packets falling within the window are checked against a
list of received packets within the window. An efficient means for
performing this check, based on the use of a bit mask, is described
in the Security Architecture document.

If the received packet falls within the window and is new, or if the
packet is to the right of the window, then the receiver proceeds to
ICV verification. If the ICV validation fails, the receiver MUST
discard the received IP datagram as invalid; this is an auditable
event. The audit log entry for this event SHOULD include the SPI
value, date/time, Source Address, Destination Address, the Sequence
Number, and (in IPv6) the Flow ID. The receive window is updated
only if the ICV verification succeeds.

DISCUSSION:

Note that if the packet is either inside the window and new, or is
outside the window on the "right" side, the receiver MUST
authenticate the packet before updating the Sequence Number window
data.

3.4.4 Integrity Check Value Verification

The receiver computes the ICV over the appropriate fields of the
packet, using the specified authentication algorithm, and verifies
that it is the same as the ICV included in the Authentication Data
field of the packet. Details of the computation are provided below.

If the computed and received ICV's match, then the datagram is valid,
and it is accepted. If the test fails, then the receiver MUST
discard the received IP datagram as invalid; this is an auditable
event. The audit log entry SHOULD include the SPI value, date/time
received, Source Address, Destination Address, and (in IPv6) the Flow
ID.

DISCUSSION:

Begin by saving the ICV value and replacing it (but not any
Authentication Data padding) with zero. Zero all other fields
that may have been modified during transit. (See section 3.3.3.1
for a discussion of which fields are zeroed before performing the
ICV calculation.) Check the overall length of the packet, and if
it requires implicit padding based on the requirements of the
authentication algorithm, append zero-filled bytes to the end of
the packet as required. Perform the ICV computation and compare
the result with the saved value, using the comparison rules
defined by the algorithm specification. (For example, if a
digital signature and one-way hash are used for the ICV
computation, the matching process is more complex.)

4. Auditing

Not all systems that implement AH will implement auditing. However,
if AH is incorporated into a system that supports auditing, then the
AH implementation MUST also support auditing and MUST allow a system
administrator to enable or disable auditing for AH. For the most
part, the granularity of auditing is a local matter. However,
several auditable events are identified in this specification and for
each of these events a minimum set of information that SHOULD be
included in an audit log is defined. Additional information also MAY
be included in the audit log for each of these events, and additional
events, not explicitly called out in this specification, also MAY

result in audit log entries. There is no requirement for the
receiver to transmit any message to the purported sender in response
to the detection of an auditable event, because of the potential to
induce denial of service via such action.

5. Conformance Requirements

Implementations that claim conformance or compliance with this
specification MUST fully implement the AH syntax and processing
described here and MUST comply with all requirements of the Security
Architecture document. If the key used to compute an ICV is manually
distributed, correct provision of the anti-replay service would
require correct maintenance of the counter state at the sender, until
the key is replaced, and there likely would be no automated recovery
provision if counter overflow were imminent. Thus a compliant
implementation SHOULD NOT provide this service in conjunction with
SAs that are manually keyed. A compliant AH implementation MUST
support the following mandatory-to-implement algorithms:

- HMAC with MD5 [MG97a]
- HMAC with SHA-1 [MG97b]

6. Security Considerations

Security is central to the design of this protocol, and these
security considerations permeate the specification. Additional
security-relevant aspects of using the IPsec protocol are discussed
in the Security Architecture document.

7. Differences from RFC 1826

This specification of AH differs from RFC 1826 [ATK95] in several
important respects, but the fundamental features of AH remain intact.
One goal of the revision of RFC 1826 was to provide a complete
framework for AH, with ancillary RFCs required only for algorithm
specification. For example, the anti-replay service is now an
integral, mandatory part of AH, not a feature of a transform defined
in another RFC. Carriage of a sequence number to support this
service is now required at all times. The default algorithms
required for interoperability have been changed to HMAC with MD5 or
SHA-1 (vs. keyed MD5), for security reasons. The list of IPv4 header
fields excluded from the ICV computation has been expanded to include
the OFFSET and FLAGS fields.

Another motivation for revision was to provide additional detail and
clarification of subtle points. This specification provides
rationale for exclusion of selected IPv4 header fields from AH
coverage and provides examples on positioning of AH in both the IPv4

and v6 contexts. Auditing requirements have been clarified in this
version of the specification. Tunnel mode AH was mentioned only in
passing in RFC 1826, but now is a mandatory feature of AH.
Discussion of interactions with key management and with security
labels have been moved to the Security Architecture document.

Acknowledgements

For over 3 years, this document has evolved through multiple versions
and iterations. During this time, many people have contributed
significant ideas and energy to the process and the documents
themselves. The authors would like to thank Karen Seo for providing
extensive help in the review, editing, background research, and
coordination for this version of the specification. The authors
would also like to thank the members of the IPsec and IPng working
groups, with special mention of the efforts of (in alphabetic order):
Steve Bellovin, Steve Deering, Francis Dupont, Phil Karn, Frank
Kastenholz, Perry Metzger, David Mihelcic, Hilarie Orman, Norman
Shulman, William Simpson, and Nina Yuan.

Appendix A -- Mutability of IP Options/Extension Headers

A1. IPv4 Options

This table shows how the IPv4 options are classified with regard to
"mutability". Where two references are provided, the second one
supercedes the first. This table is based in part on information
provided in RFC1700, "ASSIGNED NUMBERS", (October 1994).

Opt.
Copy Class # Name Reference
---- ----- --- ------------------------ ---------
IMMUTABLE -- included in ICV calculation
0 0 0 End of Options List [RFC791]
0 0 1 No Operation [RFC791]
1 0 2 Security [RFC1108(historic but in use)]
1 0 5 Extended Security [RFC1108(historic but in use)]
1 0 6 Commercial Security [expired I-D, now US MIL STD]
1 0 20 Router Alert [RFC2113]
1 0 21 Sender Directed Multi- [RFC1770]
Destination Delivery
MUTABLE -- zeroed
1 0 3 Loose Source Route [RFC791]
0 2 4 Time Stamp [RFC791]
0 0 7 Record Route [RFC791]
1 0 9 Strict Source Route [RFC791]
0 2 18 Traceroute [RFC1393]

EXPERIMENTAL, SUPERCEDED -- zeroed
1 0 8 Stream ID [RFC791, RFC1122 (Host Req)]
0 0 11 MTU Probe [RFC1063, RFC1191 (PMTU)]
0 0 12 MTU Reply [RFC1063, RFC1191 (PMTU)]
1 0 17 Extended Internet Proto [RFC1385, RFC1883 (IPv6)]
0 0 10 Experimental Measurement [ZSu]
1 2 13 Experimental Flow Control [Finn]
1 0 14 Experimental Access Ctl [Estrin]
0 0 15 ??? [VerSteeg]
1 0 16 IMI Traffic Descriptor [Lee]
1 0 19 Address Extension [Ullmann IPv7]

NOTE: Use of the Router Alert option is potentially incompatible with
use of IPsec. Although the option is immutable, its use implies that
each router along a packet's path will "process" the packet and
consequently might change the packet. This would happen on a hop by
hop basis as the packet goes from router to router. Prior to being
processed by the application to which the option contents are
directed, e.g., RSVP/IGMP, the packet should encounter AH processing.

However, AH processing would require that each router along the path
is a member of a multicast-SA defined by the SPI. This might pose
problems for packets that are not strictly source routed, and it
requires multicast support techniques not currently available.

NOTE: Addition or removal of any security labels (BSO, ESO, CIPSO) by
systems along a packet's path conflicts with the classification of
these IP Options as immutable and is incompatible with the use of
IPsec.

NOTE: End of Options List options SHOULD be repeated as necessary to
ensure that the IP header ends on a 4 byte boundary in order to
ensure that there are no unspecified bytes which could be used for a
covert channel.

A2. IPv6 Extension Headers

This table shows how the IPv6 Extension Headers are classified with
regard to "mutability".

Option/Extension Name Reference
----------------------------------- ---------
MUTABLE BUT PREDICTABLE -- included in ICV calculation
Routing (Type 0) [RFC1883]

BIT INDICATES IF OPTION IS MUTABLE (CHANGES UNPREDICTABLY DURING TRANSIT)
Hop by Hop options [RFC1883]
Destination options [RFC1883]

NOT APPLICABLE
Fragmentation [RFC1883]

Options -- IPv6 options in the Hop-by-Hop and Destination
Extension Headers contain a bit that indicates whether the
option might change (unpredictably) during transit. For
any option for which contents may change en-route, the
entire "Option Data" field must be treated as zero-valued
octets when computing or verifying the ICV. The Option
Type and Opt Data Len are included in the ICV calculation.
All options for which the bit indicates immutability are
included in the ICV calculation. See the IPv6
specification [DH95] for more information.

Routing (Type 0) -- The IPv6 Routing Header "Type 0" will
rearrange the address fields within the packet during
transit from source to destination. However, the contents
of the packet as it will appear at the receiver are known
to the sender and to all intermediate hops. Hence, the

IPv6 Routing Header "Type 0" is included in the
Authentication Data calculation as mutable but predictable.
The sender must order the field so that it appears as it
will at the receiver, prior to performing the ICV
computation.

Fragmentation -- Fragmentation occurs after outbound IPsec
processing (section 3.3) and reassembly occurs before
inbound IPsec processing (section 3.4). So the
Fragmentation Extension Header, if it exists, is not seen
by IPsec.

Note that on the receive side, the IP implementation could
leave a Fragmentation Extension Header in place when it
does re-assembly. If this happens, then when AH receives
the packet, before doing ICV processing, AH MUST "remove"
(or skip over) this header and change the previous header's
"Next Header" field to be the "Next Header" field in the
Fragmentation Extension Header.

Note that on the send side, the IP implementation could
give the IPsec code a packet with a Fragmentation Extension
Header with Offset of 0 (first fragment) and a More
Fragments Flag of 0 (last fragment). If this happens, then
before doing ICV processing, AH MUST first "remove" (or
skip over) this header and change the previous header's
"Next Header" field to be the "Next Header" field in the
Fragmentation Extension Header.

References

[ATK95] Atkinson, R., "The IP Authentication Header", RFC 1826,
August 1995.

[Bra97] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Level", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

[DH95] Deering, S., and B. Hinden, "Internet Protocol version 6
(IPv6) Specification", RFC 1883, December 1995.

[HC98] Harkins, D., and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange
(IKE)", RFC 2409, November 1998.

[KA97a] Kent, S., and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998.

[KA97b] Kent, S., and R. Atkinson, "IP Encapsulating Security
Payload (ESP)", RFC 2406, November 1998.

[MG97a] Madson, C., and R. Glenn, "The Use of HMAC-MD5-96 within
ESP and AH", RFC 2403, November 1998.

[MG97b] Madson, C., and R. Glenn, "The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within
ESP and AH", RFC 2404, November 1998.

[STD-2] Reynolds, J., and J. Postel, "Assigned Numbers", STD 2, RFC
1700, October 1994. See also:
http://www.iana.org/numbers.html

Disclaimer

The views and specification here are those of the authors and are not
necessarily those of their employers. The authors and their
employers specifically disclaim responsibility for any problems
arising from correct or incorrect implementation or use of this
specification.

Author Information

Stephen Kent
BBN Corporation
70 Fawcett Street
Cambridge, MA 02140
USA

Phone: +1 (617) 873-3988
EMail: kent@bbn.com

Randall Atkinson
@Home Network
425 Broadway,
Redwood City, CA 94063
USA

Phone: +1 (415) 569-5000
EMail: rja@corp.home.net

Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1998). All Rights Reserved.

This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this
document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
English.

The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.

This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.



RFC 2460 – Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification

Network Working Group                                         S. Deering
Request for Comments: 2460                                         Cisco
Obsoletes: 1883                                                R. Hinden
Category: Standards Track                                          Nokia
                                                           December 1998


                  Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6)
                             Specification

Status of this Memo

   This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
   Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
   improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
   Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
   and status of this protocol.  Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1998).  All Rights Reserved.

Abstract

   This document specifies version 6 of the Internet Protocol (IPv6),
   also sometimes referred to as IP Next Generation or IPng.

Table of Contents

   1. Introduction..................................................2
   2. Terminology...................................................3
   3. IPv6 Header Format............................................4
   4. IPv6 Extension Headers........................................6
       4.1 Extension Header Order...................................7
       4.2 Options..................................................9
       4.3 Hop-by-Hop Options Header...............................11
       4.4 Routing Header..........................................12
       4.5 Fragment Header.........................................18
       4.6 Destination Options Header..............................23
       4.7 No Next Header..........................................24
   5. Packet Size Issues...........................................24
   6. Flow Labels..................................................25
   7. Traffic Classes..............................................25
   8. Upper-Layer Protocol Issues..................................27
       8.1 Upper-Layer Checksums...................................27
       8.2 Maximum Packet Lifetime.................................28
       8.3 Maximum Upper-Layer Payload Size........................28
       8.4 Responding to Packets Carrying Routing Headers..........29



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   Appendix A. Semantics and Usage of the Flow Label Field.........30
   Appendix B. Formatting Guidelines for Options...................32
   Security Considerations.........................................35
   Acknowledgments.................................................35
   Authors' Addresses..............................................35
   References......................................................35
   Changes Since RFC-1883..........................................36
   Full Copyright Statement........................................39

1.  Introduction

   IP version 6 (IPv6) is a new version of the Internet Protocol,
   designed as the successor to IP version 4 (IPv4) [RFC-791].  The
   changes from IPv4 to IPv6 fall primarily into the following
   categories:

      o  Expanded Addressing Capabilities

         IPv6 increases the IP address size from 32 bits to 128 bits, to
         support more levels of addressing hierarchy, a much greater
         number of addressable nodes, and simpler auto-configuration of
         addresses.  The scalability of multicast routing is improved by
         adding a "scope" field to multicast addresses.  And a new type
         of address called an "anycast address" is defined, used to send
         a packet to any one of a group of nodes.

      o  Header Format Simplification

         Some IPv4 header fields have been dropped or made optional, to
         reduce the common-case processing cost of packet handling and
         to limit the bandwidth cost of the IPv6 header.

      o  Improved Support for Extensions and Options

         Changes in the way IP header options are encoded allows for
         more efficient forwarding, less stringent limits on the length
         of options, and greater flexibility for introducing new options
         in the future.

      o  Flow Labeling Capability

         A new capability is added to enable the labeling of packets
         belonging to particular traffic "flows" for which the sender
         requests special handling, such as non-default quality of
         service or "real-time" service.






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      o  Authentication and Privacy Capabilities

         Extensions to support authentication, data integrity, and
         (optional) data confidentiality are specified for IPv6.

   This document specifies the basic IPv6 header and the initially-
   defined IPv6 extension headers and options.  It also discusses packet
   size issues, the semantics of flow labels and traffic classes, and
   the effects of IPv6 on upper-layer protocols.  The format and
   semantics of IPv6 addresses are specified separately in [ADDRARCH].
   The IPv6 version of ICMP, which all IPv6 implementations are required
   to include, is specified in [ICMPv6].

2.  Terminology

   node        - a device that implements IPv6.

   router      - a node that forwards IPv6 packets not explicitly
                 addressed to itself.  [See Note below].

   host        - any node that is not a router.  [See Note below].

   upper layer - a protocol layer immediately above IPv6.  Examples are
                 transport protocols such as TCP and UDP, control
                 protocols such as ICMP, routing protocols such as OSPF,
                 and internet or lower-layer protocols being "tunneled"
                 over (i.e., encapsulated in) IPv6 such as IPX,
                 AppleTalk, or IPv6 itself.

   link        - a communication facility or medium over which nodes can
                 communicate at the link layer, i.e., the layer
                 immediately below IPv6.  Examples are Ethernets (simple
                 or bridged); PPP links; X.25, Frame Relay, or ATM
                 networks; and internet (or higher) layer "tunnels",
                 such as tunnels over IPv4 or IPv6 itself.

   neighbors   - nodes attached to the same link.

   interface   - a node's attachment to a link.

   address     - an IPv6-layer identifier for an interface or a set of
                 interfaces.

   packet      - an IPv6 header plus payload.

   link MTU    - the maximum transmission unit, i.e., maximum packet
                 size in octets, that can be conveyed over a link.




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   path MTU    - the minimum link MTU of all the links in a path between
                 a source node and a destination node.

   Note: it is possible, though unusual, for a device with multiple
   interfaces to be configured to forward non-self-destined packets
   arriving from some set (fewer than all) of its interfaces, and to
   discard non-self-destined packets arriving from its other interfaces.
   Such a device must obey the protocol requirements for routers when
   receiving packets from, and interacting with neighbors over, the
   former (forwarding) interfaces.  It must obey the protocol
   requirements for hosts when receiving packets from, and interacting
   with neighbors over, the latter (non-forwarding) interfaces.

3.  IPv6 Header Format

   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |Version| Traffic Class |           Flow Label                  |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |         Payload Length        |  Next Header  |   Hop Limit   |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   +                                                               +
   |                                                               |
   +                         Source Address                        +
   |                                                               |
   +                                                               +
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   +                                                               +
   |                                                               |
   +                      Destination Address                      +
   |                                                               |
   +                                                               +
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   Version              4-bit Internet Protocol version number = 6.

   Traffic Class        8-bit traffic class field.  See section 7.

   Flow Label           20-bit flow label.  See section 6.

   Payload Length       16-bit unsigned integer.  Length of the IPv6
                        payload, i.e., the rest of the packet following
                        this IPv6 header, in octets.  (Note that any





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                        extension headers [section 4] present are
                        considered part of the payload, i.e., included
                        in the length count.)

   Next Header          8-bit selector.  Identifies the type of header
                        immediately following the IPv6 header.  Uses the
                        same values as the IPv4 Protocol field [RFC-1700
                        et seq.].

   Hop Limit            8-bit unsigned integer.  Decremented by 1 by
                        each node that forwards the packet. The packet
                        is discarded if Hop Limit is decremented to
                        zero.

   Source Address       128-bit address of the originator of the packet.
                        See [ADDRARCH].

   Destination Address  128-bit address of the intended recipient of the
                        packet (possibly not the ultimate recipient, if
                        a Routing header is present).  See [ADDRARCH]
                        and section 4.4.






























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4.  IPv6 Extension Headers

   In IPv6, optional internet-layer information is encoded in separate
   headers that may be placed between the IPv6 header and the upper-
   layer header in a packet.  There are a small number of such extension
   headers, each identified by a distinct Next Header value.  As
   illustrated in these examples, an IPv6 packet may carry zero, one, or
   more extension headers, each identified by the Next Header field of
   the preceding header:

   +---------------+------------------------
   |  IPv6 header  | TCP header + data
   |               |
   | Next Header = |
   |      TCP      |
   +---------------+------------------------


   +---------------+----------------+------------------------
   |  IPv6 header  | Routing header | TCP header + data
   |               |                |
   | Next Header = |  Next Header = |
   |    Routing    |      TCP       |
   +---------------+----------------+------------------------


   +---------------+----------------+-----------------+-----------------
   |  IPv6 header  | Routing header | Fragment header | fragment of TCP
   |               |                |                 |  header + data
   | Next Header = |  Next Header = |  Next Header =  |
   |    Routing    |    Fragment    |       TCP       |
   +---------------+----------------+-----------------+-----------------

   With one exception, extension headers are not examined or processed
   by any node along a packet's delivery path, until the packet reaches
   the node (or each of the set of nodes, in the case of multicast)
   identified in the Destination Address field of the IPv6 header.
   There, normal demultiplexing on the Next Header field of the IPv6
   header invokes the module to process the first extension header, or
   the upper-layer header if no extension header is present.  The
   contents and semantics of each extension header determine whether or
   not to proceed to the next header.  Therefore, extension headers must
   be processed strictly in the order they appear in the packet; a
   receiver must not, for example, scan through a packet looking for a
   particular kind of extension header and process that header prior to
   processing all preceding ones.





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   The exception referred to in the preceding paragraph is the Hop-by-
   Hop Options header, which carries information that must be examined
   and processed by every node along a packet's delivery path, including
   the source and destination nodes.  The Hop-by-Hop Options header,
   when present, must immediately follow the IPv6 header.  Its presence
   is indicated by the value zero in the Next Header field of the IPv6
   header.

   If, as a result of processing a header, a node is required to proceed
   to the next header but the Next Header value in the current header is
   unrecognized by the node, it should discard the packet and send an
   ICMP Parameter Problem message to the source of the packet, with an
   ICMP Code value of 1 ("unrecognized Next Header type encountered")
   and the ICMP Pointer field containing the offset of the unrecognized
   value within the original packet.  The same action should be taken if
   a node encounters a Next Header value of zero in any header other
   than an IPv6 header.

   Each extension header is an integer multiple of 8 octets long, in
   order to retain 8-octet alignment for subsequent headers.  Multi-
   octet fields within each extension header are aligned on their
   natural boundaries, i.e., fields of width n octets are placed at an
   integer multiple of n octets from the start of the header, for n = 1,
   2, 4, or 8.

   A full implementation of IPv6 includes implementation of the
   following extension headers:

           Hop-by-Hop Options
           Routing (Type 0)
           Fragment
           Destination Options
           Authentication
           Encapsulating Security Payload

   The first four are specified in this document; the last two are
   specified in [RFC-2402] and [RFC-2406], respectively.

4.1  Extension Header Order

   When more than one extension header is used in the same packet, it is
   recommended that those headers appear in the following order:

           IPv6 header
           Hop-by-Hop Options header
           Destination Options header (note 1)
           Routing header
           Fragment header



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           Authentication header (note 2)
           Encapsulating Security Payload header (note 2)
           Destination Options header (note 3)
           upper-layer header

           note 1: for options to be processed by the first destination
                   that appears in the IPv6 Destination Address field
                   plus subsequent destinations listed in the Routing
                   header.

           note 2: additional recommendations regarding the relative
                   order of the Authentication and Encapsulating
                   Security Payload headers are given in [RFC-2406].

           note 3: for options to be processed only by the final
                   destination of the packet.

   Each extension header should occur at most once, except for the
   Destination Options header which should occur at most twice (once
   before a Routing header and once before the upper-layer header).

   If the upper-layer header is another IPv6 header (in the case of IPv6
   being tunneled over or encapsulated in IPv6), it may be followed by
   its own extension headers, which are separately subject to the same
   ordering recommendations.

   If and when other extension headers are defined, their ordering
   constraints relative to the above listed headers must be specified.

   IPv6 nodes must accept and attempt to process extension headers in
   any order and occurring any number of times in the same packet,
   except for the Hop-by-Hop Options header which is restricted to
   appear immediately after an IPv6 header only.  Nonetheless, it is
   strongly advised that sources of IPv6 packets adhere to the above
   recommended order until and unless subsequent specifications revise
   that recommendation.















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4.2  Options

   Two of the currently-defined extension headers -- the Hop-by-Hop
   Options header and the Destination Options header -- carry a variable
   number of type-length-value (TLV) encoded "options", of the following
   format:

      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+- - - - - - - - -
      |  Option Type  |  Opt Data Len |  Option Data
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+- - - - - - - - -

      Option Type          8-bit identifier of the type of option.

      Opt Data Len         8-bit unsigned integer.  Length of the Option
                           Data field of this option, in octets.

      Option Data          Variable-length field.  Option-Type-specific
                           data.

   The sequence of options within a header must be processed strictly in
   the order they appear in the header; a receiver must not, for
   example, scan through the header looking for a particular kind of
   option and process that option prior to processing all preceding
   ones.

   The Option Type identifiers are internally encoded such that their
   highest-order two bits specify the action that must be taken if the
   processing IPv6 node does not recognize the Option Type:

      00 - skip over this option and continue processing the header.

      01 - discard the packet.

      10 - discard the packet and, regardless of whether or not the
           packet's Destination Address was a multicast address, send an
           ICMP Parameter Problem, Code 2, message to the packet's
           Source Address, pointing to the unrecognized Option Type.

      11 - discard the packet and, only if the packet's Destination
           Address was not a multicast address, send an ICMP Parameter
           Problem, Code 2, message to the packet's Source Address,
           pointing to the unrecognized Option Type.

   The third-highest-order bit of the Option Type specifies whether or
   not the Option Data of that option can change en-route to the
   packet's final destination.  When an Authentication header is present





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   in the packet, for any option whose data may change en-route, its
   entire Option Data field must be treated as zero-valued octets when
   computing or verifying the packet's authenticating value.

      0 - Option Data does not change en-route

      1 - Option Data may change en-route

   The three high-order bits described above are to be treated as part
   of the Option Type, not independent of the Option Type.  That is, a
   particular option is identified by a full 8-bit Option Type, not just
   the low-order 5 bits of an Option Type.

   The same Option Type numbering space is used for both the Hop-by-Hop
   Options header and the Destination Options header.  However, the
   specification of a particular option may restrict its use to only one
   of those two headers.

   Individual options may have specific alignment requirements, to
   ensure that multi-octet values within Option Data fields fall on
   natural boundaries.  The alignment requirement of an option is
   specified using the notation xn+y, meaning the Option Type must
   appear at an integer multiple of x octets from the start of the
   header, plus y octets.  For example:

      2n    means any 2-octet offset from the start of the header.
      8n+2  means any 8-octet offset from the start of the header,
            plus 2 octets.

   There are two padding options which are used when necessary to align
   subsequent options and to pad out the containing header to a multiple
   of 8 octets in length.  These padding options must be recognized by
   all IPv6 implementations:

   Pad1 option  (alignment requirement: none)

      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |       0       |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

      NOTE! the format of the Pad1 option is a special case -- it does
            not have length and value fields.

      The Pad1 option is used to insert one octet of padding into the
      Options area of a header.  If more than one octet of padding is
      required, the PadN option, described next, should be used, rather
      than multiple Pad1 options.




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   PadN option  (alignment requirement: none)

      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+- - - - - - - - -
      |       1       |  Opt Data Len |  Option Data
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+- - - - - - - - -

      The PadN option is used to insert two or more octets of padding
      into the Options area of a header.  For N octets of padding, the
      Opt Data Len field contains the value N-2, and the Option Data
      consists of N-2 zero-valued octets.

   Appendix B contains formatting guidelines for designing new options.

4.3  Hop-by-Hop Options Header

   The Hop-by-Hop Options header is used to carry optional information
   that must be examined by every node along a packet's delivery path.
   The Hop-by-Hop Options header is identified by a Next Header value of
   0 in the IPv6 header, and has the following format:

    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |  Next Header  |  Hdr Ext Len  |                               |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                               +
    |                                                               |
    .                                                               .
    .                            Options                            .
    .                                                               .
    |                                                               |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   Next Header          8-bit selector.  Identifies the type of header
                        immediately following the Hop-by-Hop Options
                        header.  Uses the same values as the IPv4
                        Protocol field [RFC-1700 et seq.].

   Hdr Ext Len          8-bit unsigned integer.  Length of the Hop-by-
                        Hop Options header in 8-octet units, not
                        including the first 8 octets.

   Options              Variable-length field, of length such that the
                        complete Hop-by-Hop Options header is an integer
                        multiple of 8 octets long.  Contains one or more
                        TLV-encoded options, as described in section
                        4.2.

   The only hop-by-hop options defined in this document are the Pad1 and
   PadN options specified in section 4.2.




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4.4  Routing Header

   The Routing header is used by an IPv6 source to list one or more
   intermediate nodes to be "visited" on the way to a packet's
   destination.  This function is very similar to IPv4's Loose Source
   and Record Route option.  The Routing header is identified by a Next
   Header value of 43 in the immediately preceding header, and has the
   following format:

    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |  Next Header  |  Hdr Ext Len  |  Routing Type | Segments Left |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |                                                               |
    .                                                               .
    .                       type-specific data                      .
    .                                                               .
    |                                                               |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   Next Header          8-bit selector.  Identifies the type of header
                        immediately following the Routing header.  Uses
                        the same values as the IPv4 Protocol field
                        [RFC-1700 et seq.].

   Hdr Ext Len          8-bit unsigned integer.  Length of the Routing
                        header in 8-octet units, not including the first
                        8 octets.

   Routing Type         8-bit identifier of a particular Routing header
                        variant.

   Segments Left        8-bit unsigned integer.  Number of route
                        segments remaining, i.e., number of explicitly
                        listed intermediate nodes still to be visited
                        before reaching the final destination.

   type-specific data   Variable-length field, of format determined by
                        the Routing Type, and of length such that the
                        complete Routing header is an integer multiple
                        of 8 octets long.

   If, while processing a received packet, a node encounters a Routing
   header with an unrecognized Routing Type value, the required behavior
   of the node depends on the value of the Segments Left field, as
   follows:






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      If Segments Left is zero, the node must ignore the Routing header
      and proceed to process the next header in the packet, whose type
      is identified by the Next Header field in the Routing header.

      If Segments Left is non-zero, the node must discard the packet and
      send an ICMP Parameter Problem, Code 0, message to the packet's
      Source Address, pointing to the unrecognized Routing Type.

   If, after processing a Routing header of a received packet, an
   intermediate node determines that the packet is to be forwarded onto
   a link whose link MTU is less than the size of the packet, the node
   must discard the packet and send an ICMP Packet Too Big message to
   the packet's Source Address.






































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   The Type 0 Routing header has the following format:

    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |  Next Header  |  Hdr Ext Len  | Routing Type=0| Segments Left |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |                            Reserved                           |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |                                                               |
    +                                                               +
    |                                                               |
    +                           Address[1]                          +
    |                                                               |
    +                                                               +
    |                                                               |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |                                                               |
    +                                                               +
    |                                                               |
    +                           Address[2]                          +
    |                                                               |
    +                                                               +
    |                                                               |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    .                               .                               .
    .                               .                               .
    .                               .                               .
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |                                                               |
    +                                                               +
    |                                                               |
    +                           Address[n]                          +
    |                                                               |
    +                                                               +
    |                                                               |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   Next Header          8-bit selector.  Identifies the type of header
                        immediately following the Routing header.  Uses
                        the same values as the IPv4 Protocol field
                        [RFC-1700 et seq.].

   Hdr Ext Len          8-bit unsigned integer.  Length of the Routing
                        header in 8-octet units, not including the first
                        8 octets.  For the Type 0 Routing header, Hdr
                        Ext Len is equal to two times the number of
                        addresses in the header.

   Routing Type         0.



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   Segments Left        8-bit unsigned integer.  Number of route
                        segments remaining, i.e., number of explicitly
                        listed intermediate nodes still to be visited
                        before reaching the final destination.

   Reserved             32-bit reserved field.  Initialized to zero for
                        transmission; ignored on reception.

   Address[1..n]        Vector of 128-bit addresses, numbered 1 to n.

   Multicast addresses must not appear in a Routing header of Type 0, or
   in the IPv6 Destination Address field of a packet carrying a Routing
   header of Type 0.

   A Routing header is not examined or processed until it reaches the
   node identified in the Destination Address field of the IPv6 header.
   In that node, dispatching on the Next Header field of the immediately
   preceding header causes the Routing header module to be invoked,
   which, in the case of Routing Type 0, performs the following
   algorithm:































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   if Segments Left = 0 {
      proceed to process the next header in the packet, whose type is
      identified by the Next Header field in the Routing header
   }
   else if Hdr Ext Len is odd {
         send an ICMP Parameter Problem, Code 0, message to the Source
         Address, pointing to the Hdr Ext Len field, and discard the
         packet
   }
   else {
      compute n, the number of addresses in the Routing header, by
      dividing Hdr Ext Len by 2

      if Segments Left is greater than n {
         send an ICMP Parameter Problem, Code 0, message to the Source
         Address, pointing to the Segments Left field, and discard the
         packet
      }
      else {
         decrement Segments Left by 1;
         compute i, the index of the next address to be visited in
         the address vector, by subtracting Segments Left from n

         if Address [i] or the IPv6 Destination Address is multicast {
            discard the packet
         }
         else {
            swap the IPv6 Destination Address and Address[i]

            if the IPv6 Hop Limit is less than or equal to 1 {
               send an ICMP Time Exceeded -- Hop Limit Exceeded in
               Transit message to the Source Address and discard the
               packet
            }
            else {
               decrement the Hop Limit by 1

               resubmit the packet to the IPv6 module for transmission
               to the new destination
            }
         }
      }
   }








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   As an example of the effects of the above algorithm, consider the
   case of a source node S sending a packet to destination node D, using
   a Routing header to cause the packet to be routed via intermediate
   nodes I1, I2, and I3.  The values of the relevant IPv6 header and
   Routing header fields on each segment of the delivery path would be
   as follows:

   As the packet travels from S to I1:

        Source Address = S                  Hdr Ext Len = 6
        Destination Address = I1            Segments Left = 3
                                            Address[1] = I2
                                            Address[2] = I3
                                            Address[3] = D

   As the packet travels from I1 to I2:

        Source Address = S                  Hdr Ext Len = 6
        Destination Address = I2            Segments Left = 2
                                            Address[1] = I1
                                            Address[2] = I3
                                            Address[3] = D

   As the packet travels from I2 to I3:

        Source Address = S                  Hdr Ext Len = 6
        Destination Address = I3            Segments Left = 1
                                            Address[1] = I1
                                            Address[2] = I2
                                            Address[3] = D

   As the packet travels from I3 to D:

        Source Address = S                  Hdr Ext Len = 6
        Destination Address = D             Segments Left = 0
                                            Address[1] = I1
                                            Address[2] = I2
                                            Address[3] = I3













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4.5  Fragment Header

   The Fragment header is used by an IPv6 source to send a packet larger
   than would fit in the path MTU to its destination.  (Note: unlike
   IPv4, fragmentation in IPv6 is performed only by source nodes, not by
   routers along a packet's delivery path -- see section 5.)  The
   Fragment header is identified by a Next Header value of 44 in the
   immediately preceding header, and has the following format:

   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |  Next Header  |   Reserved    |      Fragment Offset    |Res|M|
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                         Identification                        |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   Next Header          8-bit selector.  Identifies the initial header
                        type of the Fragmentable Part of the original
                        packet (defined below).  Uses the same values as
                        the IPv4 Protocol field [RFC-1700 et seq.].

   Reserved             8-bit reserved field.  Initialized to zero for
                        transmission; ignored on reception.

   Fragment Offset      13-bit unsigned integer.  The offset, in 8-octet
                        units, of the data following this header,
                        relative to the start of the Fragmentable Part
                        of the original packet.

   Res                  2-bit reserved field.  Initialized to zero for
                        transmission; ignored on reception.

   M flag               1 = more fragments; 0 = last fragment.

   Identification       32 bits.  See description below.

   In order to send a packet that is too large to fit in the MTU of the
   path to its destination, a source node may divide the packet into
   fragments and send each fragment as a separate packet, to be
   reassembled at the receiver.

   For every packet that is to be fragmented, the source node generates
   an Identification value. The Identification must be different than
   that of any other fragmented packet sent recently* with the same
   Source Address and Destination Address.  If a Routing header is
   present, the Destination Address of concern is that of the final
   destination.





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      * "recently" means within the maximum likely lifetime of a packet,
        including transit time from source to destination and time spent
        awaiting reassembly with other fragments of the same packet.
        However, it is not required that a source node know the maximum
        packet lifetime.  Rather, it is assumed that the requirement can
        be met by maintaining the Identification value as a simple, 32-
        bit, "wrap-around" counter, incremented each time a packet must
        be fragmented.  It is an implementation choice whether to
        maintain a single counter for the node or multiple counters,
        e.g., one for each of the node's possible source addresses, or
        one for each active (source address, destination address)
        combination.

   The initial, large, unfragmented packet is referred to as the
   "original packet", and it is considered to consist of two parts, as
   illustrated:

   original packet:

   +------------------+----------------------//-----------------------+
   |  Unfragmentable  |                 Fragmentable                  |
   |       Part       |                     Part                      |
   +------------------+----------------------//-----------------------+

      The Unfragmentable Part consists of the IPv6 header plus any
      extension headers that must be processed by nodes en route to the
      destination, that is, all headers up to and including the Routing
      header if present, else the Hop-by-Hop Options header if present,
      else no extension headers.

      The Fragmentable Part consists of the rest of the packet, that is,
      any extension headers that need be processed only by the final
      destination node(s), plus the upper-layer header and data.

   The Fragmentable Part of the original packet is divided into
   fragments, each, except possibly the last ("rightmost") one, being an
   integer multiple of 8 octets long.  The fragments are transmitted in
   separate "fragment packets" as illustrated:

   original packet:

   +------------------+--------------+--------------+--//--+----------+
   |  Unfragmentable  |    first     |    second    |      |   last   |
   |       Part       |   fragment   |   fragment   | .... | fragment |
   +------------------+--------------+--------------+--//--+----------+






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   fragment packets:

   +------------------+--------+--------------+
   |  Unfragmentable  |Fragment|    first     |
   |       Part       | Header |   fragment   |
   +------------------+--------+--------------+

   +------------------+--------+--------------+
   |  Unfragmentable  |Fragment|    second    |
   |       Part       | Header |   fragment   |
   +------------------+--------+--------------+
                         o
                         o
                         o
   +------------------+--------+----------+
   |  Unfragmentable  |Fragment|   last   |
   |       Part       | Header | fragment |
   +------------------+--------+----------+

   Each fragment packet is composed of:

      (1) The Unfragmentable Part of the original packet, with the
          Payload Length of the original IPv6 header changed to contain
          the length of this fragment packet only (excluding the length
          of the IPv6 header itself), and the Next Header field of the
          last header of the Unfragmentable Part changed to 44.

      (2) A Fragment header containing:

               The Next Header value that identifies the first header of
               the Fragmentable Part of the original packet.

               A Fragment Offset containing the offset of the fragment,
               in 8-octet units, relative to the start of the
               Fragmentable Part of the original packet.  The Fragment
               Offset of the first ("leftmost") fragment is 0.

               An M flag value of 0 if the fragment is the last
               ("rightmost") one, else an M flag value of 1.

               The Identification value generated for the original
               packet.

      (3) The fragment itself.

   The lengths of the fragments must be chosen such that the resulting
   fragment packets fit within the MTU of the path to the packets'
   destination(s).



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   At the destination, fragment packets are reassembled into their
   original, unfragmented form, as illustrated:

   reassembled original packet:

   +------------------+----------------------//------------------------+
   |  Unfragmentable  |                 Fragmentable                   |
   |       Part       |                     Part                       |
   +------------------+----------------------//------------------------+

   The following rules govern reassembly:

      An original packet is reassembled only from fragment packets that
      have the same Source Address, Destination Address, and Fragment
      Identification.

      The Unfragmentable Part of the reassembled packet consists of all
      headers up to, but not including, the Fragment header of the first
      fragment packet (that is, the packet whose Fragment Offset is
      zero), with the following two changes:

         The Next Header field of the last header of the Unfragmentable
         Part is obtained from the Next Header field of the first
         fragment's Fragment header.

         The Payload Length of the reassembled packet is computed from
         the length of the Unfragmentable Part and the length and offset
         of the last fragment.  For example, a formula for computing the
         Payload Length of the reassembled original packet is:

           PL.orig = PL.first - FL.first - 8 + (8 * FO.last) + FL.last

           where
           PL.orig  = Payload Length field of reassembled packet.
           PL.first = Payload Length field of first fragment packet.
           FL.first = length of fragment following Fragment header of
                      first fragment packet.
           FO.last  = Fragment Offset field of Fragment header of
                      last fragment packet.
           FL.last  = length of fragment following Fragment header of
                      last fragment packet.

      The Fragmentable Part of the reassembled packet is constructed
      from the fragments following the Fragment headers in each of the
      fragment packets.  The length of each fragment is computed by
      subtracting from the packet's Payload Length the length of the





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      headers between the IPv6 header and fragment itself; its relative
      position in Fragmentable Part is computed from its Fragment Offset
      value.

      The Fragment header is not present in the final, reassembled
      packet.

   The following error conditions may arise when reassembling fragmented
   packets:

      If insufficient fragments are received to complete reassembly of a
      packet within 60 seconds of the reception of the first-arriving
      fragment of that packet, reassembly of that packet must be
      abandoned and all the fragments that have been received for that
      packet must be discarded.  If the first fragment (i.e., the one
      with a Fragment Offset of zero) has been received, an ICMP Time
      Exceeded -- Fragment Reassembly Time Exceeded message should be
      sent to the source of that fragment.

      If the length of a fragment, as derived from the fragment packet's
      Payload Length field, is not a multiple of 8 octets and the M flag
      of that fragment is 1, then that fragment must be discarded and an
      ICMP Parameter Problem, Code 0, message should be sent to the
      source of the fragment, pointing to the Payload Length field of
      the fragment packet.

      If the length and offset of a fragment are such that the Payload
      Length of the packet reassembled from that fragment would exceed
      65,535 octets, then that fragment must be discarded and an ICMP
      Parameter Problem, Code 0, message should be sent to the source of
      the fragment, pointing to the Fragment Offset field of the
      fragment packet.

   The following conditions are not expected to occur, but are not
   considered errors if they do:

      The number and content of the headers preceding the Fragment
      header of different fragments of the same original packet may
      differ.  Whatever headers are present, preceding the Fragment
      header in each fragment packet, are processed when the packets
      arrive, prior to queueing the fragments for reassembly.  Only
      those headers in the Offset zero fragment packet are retained in
      the reassembled packet.

      The Next Header values in the Fragment headers of different
      fragments of the same original packet may differ.  Only the value
      from the Offset zero fragment packet is used for reassembly.




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4.6  Destination Options Header

   The Destination Options header is used to carry optional information
   that need be examined only by a packet's destination node(s).  The
   Destination Options header is identified by a Next Header value of 60
   in the immediately preceding header, and has the following format:

    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |  Next Header  |  Hdr Ext Len  |                               |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                               +
    |                                                               |
    .                                                               .
    .                            Options                            .
    .                                                               .
    |                                                               |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   Next Header          8-bit selector.  Identifies the type of header
                        immediately following the Destination Options
                        header.  Uses the same values as the IPv4
                        Protocol field [RFC-1700 et seq.].

   Hdr Ext Len          8-bit unsigned integer.  Length of the
                        Destination Options header in 8-octet units, not
                        including the first 8 octets.

   Options              Variable-length field, of length such that the
                        complete Destination Options header is an
                        integer multiple of 8 octets long.  Contains one
                        or  more TLV-encoded options, as described in
                        section 4.2.

   The only destination options defined in this document are the Pad1
   and PadN options specified in section 4.2.

   Note that there are two possible ways to encode optional destination
   information in an IPv6 packet: either as an option in the Destination
   Options header, or as a separate extension header.  The Fragment
   header and the Authentication header are examples of the latter
   approach.  Which approach can be used depends on what action is
   desired of a destination node that does not understand the optional
   information:

      o  If the desired action is for the destination node to discard
         the packet and, only if the packet's Destination Address is not
         a multicast address, send an ICMP Unrecognized Type message to
         the packet's Source Address, then the information may be
         encoded either as a separate header or as an option in the



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         Destination Options header whose Option Type has the value 11
         in its highest-order two bits.  The choice may depend on such
         factors as which takes fewer octets, or which yields better
         alignment or more efficient parsing.

      o  If any other action is desired, the information must be encoded
         as an option in the Destination Options header whose Option
         Type has the value 00, 01, or 10 in its highest-order two bits,
         specifying the desired action (see section 4.2).

4.7 No Next Header

   The value 59 in the Next Header field of an IPv6 header or any
   extension header indicates that there is nothing following that
   header.  If the Payload Length field of the IPv6 header indicates the
   presence of octets past the end of a header whose Next Header field
   contains 59, those octets must be ignored, and passed on unchanged if
   the packet is forwarded.

5. Packet Size Issues

   IPv6 requires that every link in the internet have an MTU of 1280
   octets or greater.  On any link that cannot convey a 1280-octet
   packet in one piece, link-specific fragmentation and reassembly must
   be provided at a layer below IPv6.

   Links that have a configurable MTU (for example, PPP links [RFC-
   1661]) must be configured to have an MTU of at least 1280 octets; it
   is recommended that they be configured with an MTU of 1500 octets or
   greater, to accommodate possible encapsulations (i.e., tunneling)
   without incurring IPv6-layer fragmentation.

   From each link to which a node is directly attached, the node must be
   able to accept packets as large as that link's MTU.

   It is strongly recommended that IPv6 nodes implement Path MTU
   Discovery [RFC-1981], in order to discover and take advantage of path
   MTUs greater than 1280 octets.  However, a minimal IPv6
   implementation (e.g., in a boot ROM) may simply restrict itself to
   sending packets no larger than 1280 octets, and omit implementation
   of Path MTU Discovery.

   In order to send a packet larger than a path's MTU, a node may use
   the IPv6 Fragment header to fragment the packet at the source and
   have it reassembled at the destination(s).  However, the use of such
   fragmentation is discouraged in any application that is able to
   adjust its packets to fit the measured path MTU (i.e., down to 1280
   octets).



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   A node must be able to accept a fragmented packet that, after
   reassembly, is as large as 1500 octets.  A node is permitted to
   accept fragmented packets that reassemble to more than 1500 octets.
   An upper-layer protocol or application that depends on IPv6
   fragmentation to send packets larger than the MTU of a path should
   not send packets larger than 1500 octets unless it has assurance that
   the destination is capable of reassembling packets of that larger
   size.

   In response to an IPv6 packet that is sent to an IPv4 destination
   (i.e., a packet that undergoes translation from IPv6 to IPv4), the
   originating IPv6 node may receive an ICMP Packet Too Big message
   reporting a Next-Hop MTU less than 1280.  In that case, the IPv6 node
   is not required to reduce the size of subsequent packets to less than
   1280, but must include a Fragment header in those packets so that the
   IPv6-to-IPv4 translating router can obtain a suitable Identification
   value to use in resulting IPv4 fragments.  Note that this means the
   payload may have to be reduced to 1232 octets (1280 minus 40 for the
   IPv6 header and 8 for the Fragment header), and smaller still if
   additional extension headers are used.

6.  Flow Labels

   The 20-bit Flow Label field in the IPv6 header may be used by a
   source to label sequences of packets for which it requests special
   handling by the IPv6 routers, such as non-default quality of service
   or "real-time" service.  This aspect of IPv6 is, at the time of
   writing, still experimental and subject to change as the requirements
   for flow support in the Internet become clearer.  Hosts or routers
   that do not support the functions of the Flow Label field are
   required to set the field to zero when originating a packet, pass the
   field on unchanged when forwarding a packet, and ignore the field
   when receiving a packet.

   Appendix A describes the current intended semantics and usage of the
   Flow Label field.

7.  Traffic Classes

   The 8-bit Traffic Class field in the IPv6 header is available for use
   by originating nodes and/or forwarding routers to identify and
   distinguish between different classes or priorities of IPv6 packets.
   At the point in time at which this specification is being written,
   there are a number of experiments underway in the use of the IPv4
   Type of Service and/or Precedence bits to provide various forms of
   "differentiated service" for IP packets, other than through the use
   of explicit flow set-up.  The Traffic Class field in the IPv6 header
   is intended to allow similar functionality to be supported in IPv6.



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   It is hoped that those experiments will eventually lead to agreement
   on what sorts of traffic classifications are most useful for IP
   packets.  Detailed definitions of the syntax and semantics of all or
   some of the IPv6 Traffic Class bits, whether experimental or intended
   for eventual standardization, are to be provided in separate
   documents.

   The following general requirements apply to the Traffic Class field:

      o  The service interface to the IPv6 service within a node must
         provide a means for an upper-layer protocol to supply the value
         of the Traffic Class bits in packets originated by that upper-
         layer protocol.  The default value must be zero for all 8 bits.

      o  Nodes that support a specific (experimental or eventual
         standard) use of some or all of the Traffic Class bits are
         permitted to change the value of those bits in packets that
         they originate, forward, or receive, as required for that
         specific use.  Nodes should ignore and leave unchanged any bits
         of the Traffic Class field for which they do not support a
         specific use.

      o  An upper-layer protocol must not assume that the value of the
         Traffic Class bits in a received packet are the same as the
         value sent by the packet's source.


























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8. Upper-Layer Protocol Issues

8.1 Upper-Layer Checksums

   Any transport or other upper-layer protocol that includes the
   addresses from the IP header in its checksum computation must be
   modified for use over IPv6, to include the 128-bit IPv6 addresses
   instead of 32-bit IPv4 addresses.  In particular, the following
   illustration shows the TCP and UDP "pseudo-header" for IPv6:

   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   +                                                               +
   |                                                               |
   +                         Source Address                        +
   |                                                               |
   +                                                               +
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   +                                                               +
   |                                                               |
   +                      Destination Address                      +
   |                                                               |
   +                                                               +
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                   Upper-Layer Packet Length                   |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                      zero                     |  Next Header  |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

      o  If the IPv6 packet contains a Routing header, the Destination
         Address used in the pseudo-header is that of the final
         destination.  At the originating node, that address will be in
         the last element of the Routing header; at the recipient(s),
         that address will be in the Destination Address field of the
         IPv6 header.

      o  The Next Header value in the pseudo-header identifies the
         upper-layer protocol (e.g., 6 for TCP, or 17 for UDP).  It will
         differ from the Next Header value in the IPv6 header if there
         are extension headers between the IPv6 header and the upper-
         layer header.

      o  The Upper-Layer Packet Length in the pseudo-header is the
         length of the upper-layer header and data (e.g., TCP header
         plus TCP data).  Some upper-layer protocols carry their own



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         length information (e.g., the Length field in the UDP header);
         for such protocols, that is the length used in the pseudo-
         header.  Other protocols (such as TCP) do not carry their own
         length information, in which case the length used in the
         pseudo-header is the Payload Length from the IPv6 header, minus
         the length of any extension headers present between the IPv6
         header and the upper-layer header.

      o  Unlike IPv4, when UDP packets are originated by an IPv6 node,
         the UDP checksum is not optional.  That is, whenever
         originating a UDP packet, an IPv6 node must compute a UDP
         checksum over the packet and the pseudo-header, and, if that
         computation yields a result of zero, it must be changed to hex
         FFFF for placement in the UDP header.  IPv6 receivers must
         discard UDP packets containing a zero checksum, and should log
         the error.

   The IPv6 version of ICMP [ICMPv6] includes the above pseudo-header in
   its checksum computation; this is a change from the IPv4 version of
   ICMP, which does not include a pseudo-header in its checksum.  The
   reason for the change is to protect ICMP from misdelivery or
   corruption of those fields of the IPv6 header on which it depends,
   which, unlike IPv4, are not covered by an internet-layer checksum.
   The Next Header field in the pseudo-header for ICMP contains the
   value 58, which identifies the IPv6 version of ICMP.

8.2 Maximum Packet Lifetime

   Unlike IPv4, IPv6 nodes are not required to enforce maximum packet
   lifetime.  That is the reason the IPv4 "Time to Live" field was
   renamed "Hop Limit" in IPv6.  In practice, very few, if any, IPv4
   implementations conform to the requirement that they limit packet
   lifetime, so this is not a change in practice.  Any upper-layer
   protocol that relies on the internet layer (whether IPv4 or IPv6) to
   limit packet lifetime ought to be upgraded to provide its own
   mechanisms for detecting and discarding obsolete packets.

8.3 Maximum Upper-Layer Payload Size

   When computing the maximum payload size available for upper-layer
   data, an upper-layer protocol must take into account the larger size
   of the IPv6 header relative to the IPv4 header.  For example, in
   IPv4, TCP's MSS option is computed as the maximum packet size (a
   default value or a value learned through Path MTU Discovery) minus 40
   octets (20 octets for the minimum-length IPv4 header and 20 octets
   for the minimum-length TCP header).  When using TCP over IPv6, the
   MSS must be computed as the maximum packet size minus 60 octets,




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   because the minimum-length IPv6 header (i.e., an IPv6 header with no
   extension headers) is 20 octets longer than a minimum-length IPv4
   header.

8.4 Responding to Packets Carrying Routing Headers

   When an upper-layer protocol sends one or more packets in response to
   a received packet that included a Routing header, the response
   packet(s) must not include a Routing header that was automatically
   derived by "reversing" the received Routing header UNLESS the
   integrity and authenticity of the received Source Address and Routing
   header have been verified (e.g., via the use of an Authentication
   header in the received packet).  In other words, only the following
   kinds of packets are permitted in response to a received packet
   bearing a Routing header:

      o  Response packets that do not carry Routing headers.

      o  Response packets that carry Routing headers that were NOT
         derived by reversing the Routing header of the received packet
         (for example, a Routing header supplied by local
         configuration).

      o  Response packets that carry Routing headers that were derived
         by reversing the Routing header of the received packet IF AND
         ONLY IF the integrity and authenticity of the Source Address
         and Routing header from the received packet have been verified
         by the responder.























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Appendix A. Semantics and Usage of the Flow Label Field

   A flow is a sequence of packets sent from a particular source to a
   particular (unicast or multicast) destination for which the source
   desires special handling by the intervening routers.  The nature of
   that special handling might be conveyed to the routers by a control
   protocol, such as a resource reservation protocol, or by information
   within the flow's packets themselves, e.g., in a hop-by-hop option.
   The details of such control protocols or options are beyond the scope
   of this document.

   There may be multiple active flows from a source to a destination, as
   well as traffic that is not associated with any flow.  A flow is
   uniquely identified by the combination of a source address and a
   non-zero flow label.  Packets that do not belong to a flow carry a
   flow label of zero.

   A flow label is assigned to a flow by the flow's source node.  New
   flow labels must be chosen (pseudo-)randomly and uniformly from the
   range 1 to FFFFF hex.  The purpose of the random allocation is to
   make any set of bits within the Flow Label field suitable for use as
   a hash key by routers, for looking up the state associated with the
   flow.

   All packets belonging to the same flow must be sent with the same
   source address, destination address, and flow label.  If any of those
   packets includes a Hop-by-Hop Options header, then they all must be
   originated with the same Hop-by-Hop Options header contents
   (excluding the Next Header field of the Hop-by-Hop Options header).
   If any of those packets includes a Routing header, then they all must
   be originated with the same contents in all extension headers up to
   and including the Routing header (excluding the Next Header field in
   the Routing header).  The routers or destinations are permitted, but
   not required, to verify that these conditions are satisfied.  If a
   violation is detected, it should be reported to the source by an ICMP
   Parameter Problem message, Code 0, pointing to the high-order octet
   of the Flow Label field (i.e., offset 1 within the IPv6 packet).

   The maximum lifetime of any flow-handling state established along a
   flow's path must be specified as part of the description of the
   state-establishment mechanism, e.g., the resource reservation
   protocol or the flow-setup hop-by-hop option.  A source must not re-
   use a flow label for a new flow within the maximum lifetime of any
   flow-handling state that might have been established for the prior
   use of that flow label.






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   When a node stops and restarts (e.g., as a result of a "crash"), it
   must be careful not to use a flow label that it might have used for
   an earlier flow whose lifetime may not have expired yet.  This may be
   accomplished by recording flow label usage on stable storage so that
   it can be remembered across crashes, or by refraining from using any
   flow labels until the maximum lifetime of any possible previously
   established flows has expired.  If the minimum time for rebooting the
   node is known, that time can be deducted from the necessary waiting
   period before starting to allocate flow labels.

   There is no requirement that all, or even most, packets belong to
   flows, i.e., carry non-zero flow labels.  This observation is placed
   here to remind protocol designers and implementors not to assume
   otherwise.  For example, it would be unwise to design a router whose
   performance would be adequate only if most packets belonged to flows,
   or to design a header compression scheme that only worked on packets
   that belonged to flows.


































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Appendix B. Formatting Guidelines for Options

   This appendix gives some advice on how to lay out the fields when
   designing new options to be used in the Hop-by-Hop Options header or
   the Destination Options header, as described in section 4.2.  These
   guidelines are based on the following assumptions:

      o  One desirable feature is that any multi-octet fields within the
         Option Data area of an option be aligned on their natural
         boundaries, i.e., fields of width n octets should be placed at
         an integer multiple of n octets from the start of the Hop-by-
         Hop or Destination Options header, for n = 1, 2, 4, or 8.

      o  Another desirable feature is that the Hop-by-Hop or Destination
         Options header take up as little space as possible, subject to
         the requirement that the header be an integer multiple of 8
         octets long.

      o  It may be assumed that, when either of the option-bearing
         headers are present, they carry a very small number of options,
         usually only one.

   These assumptions suggest the following approach to laying out the
   fields of an option: order the fields from smallest to largest, with
   no interior padding, then derive the alignment requirement for the
   entire option based on the alignment requirement of the largest field
   (up to a maximum alignment of 8 octets).  This approach is
   illustrated in the following examples:

   Example 1

   If an option X required two data fields, one of length 8 octets and
   one of length 4 octets, it would be laid out as follows:


                                   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                                   | Option Type=X |Opt Data Len=12|
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                         4-octet field                         |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   +                         8-octet field                         +
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+







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   Its alignment requirement is 8n+2, to ensure that the 8-octet field
   starts at a multiple-of-8 offset from the start of the enclosing
   header.  A complete Hop-by-Hop or Destination Options header
   containing this one option would look as follows:

   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |  Next Header  | Hdr Ext Len=1 | Option Type=X |Opt Data Len=12|
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                         4-octet field                         |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   +                         8-octet field                         +
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   Example 2

   If an option Y required three data fields, one of length 4 octets,
   one of length 2 octets, and one of length 1 octet, it would be laid
   out as follows:

                                                   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                                                   | Option Type=Y |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |Opt Data Len=7 | 1-octet field |         2-octet field         |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                         4-octet field                         |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   Its alignment requirement is 4n+3, to ensure that the 4-octet field
   starts at a multiple-of-4 offset from the start of the enclosing
   header.  A complete Hop-by-Hop or Destination Options header
   containing this one option would look as follows:

   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |  Next Header  | Hdr Ext Len=1 | Pad1 Option=0 | Option Type=Y |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |Opt Data Len=7 | 1-octet field |         2-octet field         |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                         4-octet field                         |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | PadN Option=1 |Opt Data Len=2 |       0       |       0       |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+








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   Example 3

   A Hop-by-Hop or Destination Options header containing both options X
   and Y from Examples 1 and 2 would have one of the two following
   formats, depending on which option appeared first:

   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |  Next Header  | Hdr Ext Len=3 | Option Type=X |Opt Data Len=12|
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                         4-octet field                         |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   +                         8-octet field                         +
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | PadN Option=1 |Opt Data Len=1 |       0       | Option Type=Y |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |Opt Data Len=7 | 1-octet field |         2-octet field         |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                         4-octet field                         |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | PadN Option=1 |Opt Data Len=2 |       0       |       0       |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |  Next Header  | Hdr Ext Len=3 | Pad1 Option=0 | Option Type=Y |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |Opt Data Len=7 | 1-octet field |         2-octet field         |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                         4-octet field                         |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | PadN Option=1 |Opt Data Len=4 |       0       |       0       |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |       0       |       0       | Option Type=X |Opt Data Len=12|
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                         4-octet field                         |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   +                         8-octet field                         +
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+









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RFC 2460                   IPv6 Specification              December 1998


Security Considerations

   The security features of IPv6 are described in the Security
   Architecture for the Internet Protocol [RFC-2401].

Acknowledgments

   The authors gratefully acknowledge the many helpful suggestions of
   the members of the IPng working group, the End-to-End Protocols
   research group, and the Internet Community At Large.

Authors' Addresses

   Stephen E. Deering
   Cisco Systems, Inc.
   170 West Tasman Drive
   San Jose, CA 95134-1706
   USA

   Phone: +1 408 527 8213
   Fax:   +1 408 527 8254
   EMail: deering@cisco.com


   Robert M. Hinden
   Nokia
   232 Java Drive
   Sunnyvale, CA 94089
   USA

   Phone: +1 408 990-2004
   Fax:   +1 408 743-5677
   EMail: hinden@iprg.nokia.com

References

   [RFC-2401]   Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the
                Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998.

   [RFC-2402]   Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "IP Authentication Header",
                RFC 2402, November 1998.

   [RFC-2406]   Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "IP Encapsulating Security
                Protocol (ESP)", RFC 2406, November 1998.

   [ICMPv6]     Conta, A. and S. Deering, "ICMP for the Internet
                Protocol Version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 2463, December 1998.




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RFC 2460                   IPv6 Specification              December 1998


   [ADDRARCH]   Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing
                Architecture", RFC 2373, July 1998.

   [RFC-1981]   McCann, J., Mogul, J. and S. Deering, "Path MTU
                Discovery for IP version 6", RFC 1981, August 1996.

   [RFC-791]    Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791,
                September 1981.

   [RFC-1700]   Reynolds, J. and J. Postel, "Assigned Numbers", STD 2,
                RFC 1700, October 1994.  See also:
                http://www.iana.org/numbers.html

   [RFC-1661]   Simpson, W., "The Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP)", STD
                51, RFC 1661, July 1994.

CHANGES SINCE RFC-1883

   This memo has the following changes from RFC-1883.  Numbers identify
   the Internet-Draft version in which the change was made.

    02) Removed all references to jumbograms and the Jumbo Payload
        option (moved to a separate document).

    02) Moved most of Flow Label description from section 6 to (new)
        Appendix A.

    02) In Flow Label description, now in Appendix A, corrected maximum
        Flow Label value from FFFFFF to FFFFF (i.e., one less "F") due
        to reduction of size of Flow Label field from 24 bits to 20
        bits.

    02) Renumbered (relettered?) the previous Appendix A to be Appendix
        B.

    02) Changed the wording of the Security Considerations section to
        avoid dependency loop between this spec and the IPsec specs.

    02) Updated R. Hinden's email address and company affiliation.


        --------------------------------------------------------

    01) In section 3, changed field name "Class" to "Traffic Class" and
        increased its size from 4 to 8 bits.  Decreased size of Flow
        Label field from 24 to 20 bits to compensate for increase in
        Traffic Class field.




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    01) In section 4.1, restored the order of the Authentication Header
        and the ESP header, which were mistakenly swapped in the 00
        version of this memo.

    01) In section 4.4, deleted the Strict/Loose Bit Map field and the
        strict routing functionality from the Type 0 Routing header, and
        removed the restriction on number of addresses that may be
        carried in the Type 0 Routing header (was limited to 23
        addresses, because of the size of the strict/loose bit map).

    01) In section 5, changed the minimum IPv6 MTU from 576 to 1280
        octets, and added a recommendation that links with configurable
        MTU (e.g., PPP links) be configured to have an MTU of at least
        1500 octets.

    01) In section 5, deleted the requirement that a node must not send
        fragmented packets that reassemble to more than 1500 octets
        without knowledge of the destination reassembly buffer size, and
        replaced it with a recommendation that upper-layer protocols or
        applications should not do that.

    01) Replaced reference to the IPv4 Path MTU Discovery spec (RFC-
        1191) with reference to the IPv6 Path MTU Discovery spec (RFC-
        1981), and deleted the Notes at the end of section 5 regarding
        Path MTU Discovery, since those details are now covered by RFC-
        1981.

    01) In section 6, deleted specification of "opportunistic" flow
        set-up, and removed all references to the 6-second maximum
        lifetime for opportunistically established flow state.

    01) In section 7, deleted the provisional description of the
        internal structure and semantics of the Traffic Class field, and
        specified that such descriptions be provided in separate
        documents.

        --------------------------------------------------------

    00) In section 4, corrected the Code value to indicate "unrecognized
        Next Header type encountered" in an ICMP Parameter Problem
        message (changed from 2 to 1).

    00) In the description of the Payload Length field in section 3, and
        of the Jumbo Payload Length field in section 4.3, made it
        clearer that extension headers are included in the payload
        length count.





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    00) In section 4.1, swapped the order of the Authentication header
        and the ESP header.  (NOTE: this was a mistake, and the change
        was undone in version 01.)

    00) In section 4.2, made it clearer that options are identified by
        the full 8-bit Option Type, not by the low-order 5 bits of an
        Option Type.  Also specified that the same Option Type numbering
        space is used for both Hop-by-Hop Options and Destination
        Options headers.

    00) In section 4.4, added a sentence requiring that nodes processing
        a Routing header must send an ICMP Packet Too Big message in
        response to a packet that is too big to fit in the next hop link
        (rather than, say, performing fragmentation).

    00) Changed the name of the IPv6 Priority field to "Class", and
        replaced the previous description of Priority in section 7 with
        a description of the Class field.  Also, excluded this field
        from the set of fields that must remain the same for all packets
        in the same flow, as specified in section 6.

    00) In the pseudo-header in section 8.1, changed the name of the
        "Payload Length" field to "Upper-Layer Packet Length".  Also
        clarified that, in the case of protocols that carry their own
        length info (like non-jumbogram UDP), it is the upper-layer-
        derived length, not the IP-layer-derived length, that is used in
        the pseudo-header.

    00) Added section 8.4, specifying that upper-layer protocols, when
        responding to a received packet that carried a Routing header,
        must not include the reverse of the Routing header in the
        response packet(s) unless the received Routing header was
        authenticated.

    00) Fixed some typos and grammatical errors.

    00) Authors' contact info updated.

        --------------------------------------------------------












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Full Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1998).  All Rights Reserved.

   This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
   others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
   or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
   and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
   kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
   included on all such copies and derivative works.  However, this
   document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
   the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
   Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
   developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
   copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
   followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
   English.

   The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
   revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.

   This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
   "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
   TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
   BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
   HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
   MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
























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